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In the tumultuous wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks upon
the United States, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced that
the investigative and prosecutorial resources of the federal govern-
ment would need to be shifted.' Ashcroft acknowledged that
prosecutorial priorities would need to be redrawn to target serious
offenses that threatened national interests. The Attorney General's
declaration instigated considerable public speculation as to how the
federal government might re-prioritize its efforts to reflect changing
realities.2 Some queried whether this retrenchment might fore-
shadow a federal retreat from the so-called war on drugs, or whether it
might usher in a shift of many criminal matters back to the states to
address. With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security,
significant changes to federal criminal law, and the sharing of intelli-
* Associate Professor, George Mason University School of Law; Commissioner,
United States Sentencing Commission. The opinions expressed in this Article are my
own, and do not necessarily reflect either the policies or the official positions of the
Sentencing Commission. I appreciate the comments I received from Leandra
Lederman, Jeffrey Parker, and Todd Zywicki, my colleagues at George Mason
University, and my co-commissioners Reuben Castillo, Sterling Johnson, Joseph
Kendall, and William Sessions, who provided interesting insights into their
courtrooms. I also want to thank Jeff McClellan and Meghan Faturous for their
invaluable research assistance, and Frank Buckley and the George Mason University
Law and Economics Center for generous financial support.
1 John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General, Attorney General Ashcroft and Deputy
Attorney General Thompson Announce Reorganization and Mobilization of the Na-
tion's Justice and Law Enforcement Resources (Nov. 8, 2001), at http://
www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarksll_08.htm, (last visited Nov. 21,
2003).
2 See, e.g., Naftali Bendavid, Ashcroft Proposes Shake-up of Agencies; Details Sketchy;
Congress Dubious, CHI. TRUB., Nov. 9, 2001, at 1; Dan Eggen, Ashcroft Plans to Reorganize
Justice, Curtail Programs, WASH. PosT, Nov. 9, 2001, at A17; David Johnston, A Nation
Challenged: The Justice Department; Ashcroft Plan Would Recast Justice Dept. in a War Mode,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001, at B.
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gence among domestic and international law enforcement agencies,
the picture is only now unfolding.
One important factor remains a constant, however: resources,
even at the national level, are scarce. Scarcity compels the federal
government to choose among competing policy objectives, each of
which demands attention and, ultimately, funding. Attorney General
Ashcroft's tacit acknowledgment of this indispensable economic real-
ity signaled that because combating terrorism would now be a na-
tional priority, 3 other public policy objectives would necessarily
receive less attention. Since the early 1970s, and presidential candi-
date Richard M. Nixon's call to use federal resources to combat crime,
the federal government has begun to direct more attention to
crime-once largely a state concern. Although federal attention to
the nation's crime problem was doubtless welcome at the time, the
unrelenting expansion of federal criminal law jurisdiction has made
the prioritization of which criminal conduct to pursue all the more
complicated.4 Federal prosecutors now have the authority to handle
cases that, a generation ago, might have fallen under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the state police power.
As a consequence of this recently announced realignment of fed-
eral investigative and law enforcement efforts, however, prosecutors
will be forced to choose even more carefully among the matters they
pursue. The manner in which prosecutors make such choices is cru-
cial, because an individual prosecutor's decision to pursue a criminal
matter sets in motion the criminal justice apparatus of the federal gov-
ernment, which stretches across investigatory and prosecutorial
boundaries to include the involvement of Article III judges, magis-
trates, juries, prison officials, and the like. An Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney's (AUSA) conclusion to indict a target thus represents a decision
to commit enormous resources to punish a particular instance of
criminality. Unlike many political decisions that are subject to rigor-
ous checks and balances, however, prosecutors enjoy considerable in-
3 The importance of terrorism prosecutions was noted in a letter from Senate
Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy and Charles E. Grassley, the ranking
member on the Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs. In that letter, the Senators
noted the high rate of prosecution declinations for terrorism referrals, and ques-
tioned the quality of investigatory efforts in this area. Letter from Patrick Leahy, Sen-
ator, U.S. Senate, and Charles E. Grassley, Senator, U.S. Senate, toJohn Ashcroft, U.S.
Attorney General, Dep't of Justice, and Robert Mueller, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation (June 14, 2002) (on file with author).
4 Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Legislating Federal Crime and its Conse-
quences: Toward a Principled Basis for Federal Criminal Legislation, 543 ANNALS Am. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. Sc. 15, 15-19 (1996).
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dependence in deciding whether to bring formal charges against an
individual. In the criminal justice system, the checks tend to come
after the prosecutor decides to pursue a target. Once that threshold
determination is made, judicial supervision, grand and petit juries,
and public scrutiny come into play. Absent a discriminatory intent
and effect, few avenues exist by which authorities outside the U.S. At-
torney's office may review the exercise of this initial decision to prose-
cute an individual. 5
For good reason, then, prosecutorial discretion is an oft-studied
topic in the academic literature. 6 Deciding whether to prosecute an
individual criminally is one of the most momentous tasks the govern-
ment undertakes. When the government decides to train its criminal
investigative and prosecutorial sights on an individual, that person is
perhaps at his or her most vulnerable. 7 Elaborate procedural protec-
tions thus exist to secure the rights of the criminally accused. Indeed,
the Constitution's framers were so cognizant of the government's po-
tential to misuse its criminal investigatory powers that substantial por-
tions of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments are
designed to protect the criminally accused and those who have been
convicted.8
The exercise of discretion, however, necessarily implies two
things. First, obviously, is the decision to proceed with a prosecution.
Such a decision is ultimately made in the public sphere and is subject
to the various procedural demands that exist in both constitutional
and statutory law. The flip side of the decision to commence a prose-
cution, however, is the decision to decline to initiate criminal proceed-
ings. Thus, a consistent question in criminal justice administration is
upon what grounds, and governed by what criteria, do prosecutors
5 See Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary
Decisions, 68 FoRDHA L. REV. 1511, 1516 n.32 (2000).
6 See, e.g., Donald I. Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion in Sher-
man Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 405 (1978); Leland E. Beck, The Administra-
tive Law of Criminal Prosecution: The Development of Prosecutorial Policy, 27 AM. U. L. REv.
310 (1978); John Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L. REv.
174 (1965); Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in The United States, 18 AM. J.
COMP. L. 532 (1970); Charles F.C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case
Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. LJ. 1171 (1977); L.B. Schwartz,
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 64
(1948). See generally JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATFOR-
NEYS IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 156 (1978).
7 See Erik G. Luna, The Models of Criminal Procedure, 2 BUFF. CraM. L. REv. 389,
476 (1999).
8 See Richard A. Champagne, Jr., The Problem of Integrity, Tradition, and Text in
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 NEB. L. REv. 78, 90-96 (1993).
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exercise their discretion not to pursue formal indictment. Declina-
tions are as unreviewable as decisions to go forward, or perhaps even
more so, as there are few formal means by which a decision to decline
prosecution may be reviewed. Although scholars tend, at least in the
legal academic literature, to focus on the interests of the criminal de-
fendant,9 the decision not to prosecute can be momentous not only
for the accused, but also for the alleged victim as well. Declination
further implicates larger questions of deterrence and the equal treat-
ment of similarly situated defendants. I0
While all prosecutorial discretion is subject to abuse, the discre-
tion invoked to decline prosecution is difficult to monitor because it is
largely hidden from public scrutiny.1' Those who might disagree with
the prosecutor's decision to be lenient-namely, the crime victim, the
public at large, the investigating agent, or even similarly situated de-
fendants who were prosecuted-have little recourse to complain. 12
Indeed, with perhaps the sole exception of the putative victim (if an
identifiable victim exists), other defendants and the general public
seldom have any idea about individuals not prosecuted.
Scarce resources, however, dictate that prosecutors will be unable
to pursue each matter that is placed upon their desk for considera-
tion. Nor is the federal government's share of the criminal law en-
forcement pie particularly significant. The federal government
prosecutes only (roughly) seven percent of all criminal cases
processed within the United States.13 The individual states handle the
bulk of the nation's criminal law enforcement. Even so, the balance
between federal investigatory and. federal prosecutory resources is
9 See, e.g., Michael P. Doss, Resentencing Defendants and the Protection Against Multi-
ple Punishment, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1409 (1985); John Wirenius, Legal Developments: A
Model of Discretion: New York's "Interests of Justice" Dismissal Statute, 58 ALB. L. REv. 175
(1994).
10 See Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1383,
1399-1401 (2002).
11 See, e.g., FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTICN: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT
WITH A CRIME 294 (1969); Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal Sys-
tem: An Empirical Study of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1042-72 (1972)
(finding that there is no effective system of checking and reviewing discretionary deci-
sions of U.S. Attorneys regarding whether to prosecute). See generally W. RANDOLPH
TESLIK, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE (1975).
12 See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY IN-
QUIRY 170-72 (1969) (explaining the injustice that results from selective enforcement
of criminal laws).
13 This number was calculated from state and federal filings by the Department
of Justice. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL
CASE PROCESSING, 2001, 2003 NCJ 197104, at 1, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/fccp01 .pdf.
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quite skewed in favor of the investigating agencies. The number of
federal investigators dwarfs the number of federal prosecutors.14 Con-
sequently, the number of matters referred is likely consistently to out-
strip the number of prosecutors available to pursue them. Moreover,
not every case referred to a U.S. Attorney's office will be of sufficient
legal merit to seek an indictment. As a routine matter, then, the U.S.
Attorneys will necessarily be forced to decline a significant portion of
the criminal referrals made to their offices. Discretion in choosing
cases to prosecute thus inevitably falls upon the individual prosecu-
tors. Such discretion is nearly invisible, however, and thus poses nu-
merous important public policy questions. If the government wants to
re-focus its prosecutorial efforts, it is vital to understand the nature of
cases that have been prosecuted in the past, and whether criminal
matters that have been declined fall into any discernable patterns.
The purpose of this empirical study is to contribute to a better
understanding of prosecutorial decisions to refuse to pursue indict-
ment and to examine the phenomenon of declination from a variety
of perspectives.15 Hopefully, if we can better understand the trends in
declinations, we will begin to better understand the reasons prosecu-
tors choose, or are forced, to decline cases. Such an understanding
will enable the government to better focus its law enforcement re-
sources on cases that truly evince a national interest and will allow
Congress to determine whether prosecutors are adequately enforcing
substantive criminal law. In addition, by understanding declination
trends, it will be possible to identify trouble spots such as whether
there are consistent problems with referrals from certain agencies or
whether prosecutors are properly adhering to national priorities.
Drawing upon recent efforts to ensure that judges are properly sen-
14 In June 2000, federal agencies employed over 88,000 full-time persons author-
ized to carry firearms and make arrests. BRIAN A. REAVES & TIMOTHY C. HART, FED-
ERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 2000, in BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN 1 (July 2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/fle00.pdf. This compares to fewer than 5000 Assistant U.S. Attorneys employed
by the government in that same year. See infra Table 6.
15 Although few empirical studies of declination decisions have been done, in no
small part because the information is difficult to come by, there have been several
early, important quantitative studies. Most notably, Professor Richard Frase per-
formed a seminal analysis of selected federal districts. See Richard S. Frase, The Deci-
sion to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U.
CHI. L. REv. 246 (1980). Similarly, an analysis of the disposition of felony arrests in
Los Angeles County showed not only the rates of prosecution by offense, but also the
reasons cited for nonprosecution of two specific offenses-burglary and possession of
dangerous drugs. PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., PROSECUTION OF ADULT FELONY DE-
FENDANTS IN Los ANGELES COUNTY: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE 94-96 (1973).
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tencing defendants, it is similarly necessary to determine whether
prosecutors are pursuing appropriate targets. 16 Without such informa-
tion, Congress and the public are left in the dark as to whether prose-
cutors are appropriately enforcing federal criminal law and following
the Attorney General's lead as he seeks to guide law enforcement
efforts.
Of course, prosecutorial discretion is not wholly unfettered. Cer-
tain guidelines to cabin prosecutorial discretion do exist. Accord-
ingly, Part I of this Article identifies several of the publicly available
declination guidelines from the Department of Justice, as well as indi-
vidual U.S. Attorneys' offices and other agencies that have a hand in
prosecuting criminal cases, and discusses their use and justification.
In particular, it examines departmental and agency guidelines for de-
clining matters and explores the legitimacy of prosecutorial discretion
generally.
Following a discussion of the extant declination policies, Part II
presents trend data on prosecutorial declinations for the period
1994-2000.17 Part II determines whether any discernable declination
patterns exist, and attempts to explain why certain matters may be
more likely to be declined. Resource allocations are examined to de-
termine whether staffing and budget changes have had much of an
effect upon AUSAs' decisions to prosecute certain criminal matters. It
seeks to understand whether the referring agency, the articulated lo-
cal or national priorities, or the nature of the underlying offense has
any effect upon a prosecutor's decision not to pursue a criminal mat-
ter. Finally, Part III discusses the policy implications of these findings,
suggesting both further avenues for research and additional guidance
that may serve to benefit prosecutors as they make these momentous
decisions that affect the dispensing of justice at the national level. In
particular, the need for written declination rules and mandatory re-
cord keeping is discussed as a means not only of controlling
prosecutorial discretion, but also as an attempt to permit Congress
and the executive branch to more carefully marshal prosecutory
resources.
16 This Article will focus primarily upon trends in declinations from 1994
through 2000, while a follow-up will examine the reasons for those declinations. See
Michael Edmund O'Neill, Understanding Why Prosecutors Decline to Pursue Cases
(Nov. 25, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
17 This is the latest date for which data are available as of this writing.
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I. PROSECUTORIAL DECISIONMAKING AND THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL.
JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. The Structure of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction
1. The Role of Main Justice
In many respects, the prosecutorial function of the Department
of Justice's (DOJ) main office in Washington, D.C., is limited. Al-
though the Criminal Division is a major component within the De-
partment, most criminal prosecutions are handled by the individual
U.S. Attorneys' offices. In fact, most criminal investigations and
agency referrals go not to Main Justice 18 at all, but instead directly to
the U.S. Attorney in the district where the violation has occurred. 19
There are really only three significant exceptions to this direct referral
system we need concern ourselves with: Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) criminal tax fraud referrals go directly to the Criminal Sections
of the Justice Department's Tax Division; Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) referrals generally go to the Criminal Division's
Fraud Section; and many environmental crime matters are referred
directly to the Department's Environment and Natural Resources
Division. 20
Consequently, the Justice Department, through its Criminal Divi-
sion, plays only a minimal, somewhat perfunctory magisterial role with
respect to most agency referrals. Those matters referred directly to
Main Justice are delegated to one of the Criminal Division's sections.
In addition to its legislative, research, and minimal litigation duties,
the Criminal Division's supervisory role can be broken down into two
functional components: (1) service and support to line prosecutors in
the field, and (2) the review of certain specific actions undertaken by
individual AUSAs. With respect to the Department's service and sup-
port function, sections within the Criminal Division act as support for
the various U.S. Attorneys' offices. Thus, the Criminal Division's Nar-
cotics Section will, for example, advise U.S. Attorneys' offices on vari-
ous matters and will act as litigation support in circumstances where
18 This moniker is used to denote the Justice Department's main components
and headquarters in Washington, D.C. See e.g.,JIM MCGEE & BRIAN DUFFY, MAIN JUS-
TICE: THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO ENFORCE THE NATION'S CRIMINAL LAWS AND GuARD
ITS LIBERTIES 14 (1996).
19 Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforce-
ment Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REv. 757, 780-81 (1999).
20 EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATrORNEYS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES AT-
TORNEYS' MANUAL §§ 6-4.200, 5-11.103, 9-2.100 (2002) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL].
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those offices may have conflicts preventing them from litigating spe-
cific cases. The Executive Office for United States Attorneys
(EOUSA), which acts as the main point of contact between the U.S.
Attorneys and Main Justice, offers among the most important services
to the field. The EOUSA provides critical liaison and coordinating
functions to the U.S. Attorneys: processing budgeting requests, ar-
ranging conferences and training, and dealing with certain adminis-
trative issues.
The Justice Department's review component is perhaps more im-
portant with respect to day-to-day decisionmaking engaged in by
AUSAs. The review section entails two different aspects: (1) adminis-
trative approval of certain actions, and (2) the monitoring and report-
ing of selected cases. 21 For example, before a U.S. Attorney may seek
an appeal in a criminal case, he must first have the approval of the
Criminal Division's Appellate Section and the Solicitor General's of-
fice. 22 Similarly, where the U.S. Attorney seeks the dismissal of an in-
dictment or intends to pursue the death penalty in a particular case,
he must have the Department's prior approval. 23 In similar fashion,
the Criminal Division's Office of Enforcement Operations must ap-
prove all requests for electronic surveillance. 24
As for the Department's monitoring and reporting requirements,
these are merely the means by which the Department tracks particular
types of cases. In fact, the data used in this article comes from the
Department's uniform reporting requirement that attorneys keep
track of all criminal matters for which they expend at least one hour
of time. 25 Although not substantive in the sense of guiding prosecu-
tor behavior, this information is vital to understanding the function-
ing of the various offices and could be employed to create or to
amend prosecutorial guidelines.
The Criminal Division's control of individual prosecution in the
field is thus quite narrow. Setting aside those cases which are politi-
cally sensitive (like the recent prosecution of House of Representa-
tives member James Traficant26) or of national importance (such as
the prosecution of the Oklahoma City bombers27), the Criminal Divi-
21 Id. § 9-2.170.
22 Id. § 9-2.170(A).
23 Id. §§ 9-10.010 to -10.050.
24 Id. §§ 9-7.100, -7.110.
25 Interview with Steve Parent, Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice, in Washington, D.C. (May 18, 2002).
26 See United States v. Traficant, 209 F. Supp. 2d 764 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
27 See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998).
[VOL- 79:1
2003] TRENDS IN FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL DECLINATIONS 229
sion and its various components generally serve merely as sources of
advice and occasional technical assistance.
Instead, the individual U.S. Attorneys' offices shoulder the vast
majority of the federal government's litigation burden. Those offices
are neither required to obtain Departmental approval prior to seeking
an indictment, nor are they obligated to report to Main Justice when
they decline to prosecute a matter.28 To this end, the decision to ne-
gotiate a plea, to pursue a particular trial strategy, or to guide a crimi-
nal investigation-in other words, all of the discretionary decisions
that shape the conduct of a criminal prosecution-remain in the
hands of the field offices and are virtually immune from review by
Main Justice. 29
2. The U.S. Attorneys' Offices
The U.S. Attorneys, who are appointed by the President and con-
firmed by the Senate to serve a four-year term, enjoy primary responsi-
bility for the prosecution of federal criminal offenses.30 They enjoy
considerable freedom from the Justice Department, in part because of
their separate appointments based on party loyalty or professional ac-
complishment, and in part as a result of their geographic separation
from Main Justice. 3' As a result, they hold enormous power in shap-
ing their offices' general enforcement policies. In addition, they have
a relatively free hand in choosing their assistants, who are often re-
sponsible for the day-to-day operations of the office. As a practical
matter, this means that the principal deputies in any office owe their
primary loyalty not to the far-off Attorney General, but rather to the
U.S. Attorneys who appointed them and with whom they closely work.
Although removable by the President,3 2 federal prosecutors are
also not beset by the same cadre of political pressures that elected
state and local prosecutors must face. Federal prosecutors are largely
28 U.S. ATroRNvs' MANUAL, supra note 20, §§ 9-2.001, -2.020.
29 Id. § 9-2.010 (granting U.S. Attorneys' offices full investigative discretion).
30 28 U.S.C. § 541(a)-(b) (2000). The Department of Justice's central offices in
Washington, D.C., also account for a tiny fraction of all federal criminal cases prose-
cuted. In addition, while military prosecutions are handled by the federal govern-
ment, they are not included in this study because they are prosecuted before military
tribunals by military officers. The rules governing such prosecutions vary considera-
bly from their civilian counterparts.
31 Richman, supra note 19, at 781.
32 28 U.S.C. § 541(c). This presidential power is rarely exercised, except when a
new President chooses to replace all U.S. Attorneys at the beginning of a new term in
office. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 6, at 97-98 (discussing the political cost of removing
U.S. Attorneys).
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immune from the political pressures that go hand-in-hand with elec-
tive office. Nevertheless, like their state counterparts, federal prosecu-
tors are subject to certain political pressures-most ostensibly coming
from Washington or arising within their particular districts. The Pres-
ident, the Attorney General, and, in some instances, Congress, may try
to direct the prosecution of particular types of offenses, and thus can
pressure individual offices to pursue those matters. Attorney General
Ashcroft's announced intention to redirect resources to the pursuit of
terrorism-related matters is a prime example of the type of general
direction an Attorney General can provide. The Attorney General
may also exert more direct influence; for example, Attorney General
Ashcroft has recently attempted with his promulgation of guidelines
to direct sentencing recommendations and appeals. 33 That memo-
randum lays out what AUSAs must do when recommending a sen-
tence or objecting to, or ultimately appealing, a pronounced
sentence. 34 Although some of the memorandum is intended to give
effect to recently enacted legislation, much of it expresses hard to su-
pervise guidance.
Of course, the Attorney General's success will be in no small mea-
sure dependent upon the willingness of the individual U.S. Attorneys'
offices to follow his lead. After all, the decisions about which criminal
offenses to pursue remain primarily community-driven. In other
words, local community interests may still determine which cases pros-
ecutors choose to pursue. If a locality is suffering from a drug epi-
demic, then prosecutors may elect to target drug dealers. Similarly, if
the community is plagued by gang violence, prosecutors may choose
to disrupt organized criminal enterprises. Local priorities thus cannot
be dismissed when prosecutorial decisionmaking is studied.
Compared to the various state substantive criminal laws, however,
federal criminal law does not vary significantly from state to state. The
laws themselves are thus constant throughout the ninety-four federal
judicial districts. This consistency makes it possible to compare decli-
nations nationally in a way that would be difficult in comparing state
prosecutorial activity. Even so, geographic locality doubtless plays a
role in deciding which cases to bring to trial.35
The U.S. Attorneys are also answerable (although in fairly small
measure) to the Attorney General, and thus are subject to a certain
33 Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General, Departmental Gui-
dance on Sentencing Recommendations and Appeals 2 (July 28, 2003) (on file with
author).
34 Id.
35 It goes without saying that fifty grams of cocaine in Manhattan do not have
quite the same meaning as fifty grams of cocaine in Iowa might.
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degree of supervision by Main Justice in Washington, D.C. 3 6 Moreo-
ver, Justice Department attorneys must screen certain types of cases
(such as those involving the tax code) and approval must be granted
before a prosecution may proceed. 37 In the vast majority of cases,
however, the U.S. Attorney has nearly complete control over which
charges, if any, will be filed in his or her district.
B. The Legitimacy of Prosecutorial Discretion
Congress has mandated that "except as otherwise provided by
law, each U.S. Attorney, within his district, shall-(1) Prosecute for all
offenses against the United States .... -38 Read literally, this language
would appear to establish an absolute duty on the part of each U.S.
Attorney to prosecute every violation of federal criminal law occurring
within his or her district. Despite tlis fairly straightforward statutory
injunction, however, it is beyond peradventure that no one expects
any U.S. Attorney to prosecute every detected federal crime she hap-
pens upon.3 9 The scarcity of resources, the impossibility of "perfect"
enforcement, sound public policy determinations, and a host of other
reasons mitigate against fulfillment of the congressional directive and,
as a matter of custom and tradition, demand that U.S. Attorneys exer-
cise sound judgment in selecting among a variety of cases to
prosecute.
It cannot be forgotten, however, that the inevitability of
prosecutorial discretion is very much a creature of pragmatism. Legis-
latures, in criminalizing certain types of activity, necessarily paint with
a broad brush. After all, Congress, as an institution, is ill-equipped to
36 Title 28 provides that the Attorney General "shall supervise all litigation to
which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, and shall direct all
United States Attorneys . . . in the discharge of their respective duties." 28 U.S.C.
§ 519. Additionally, § 542 of Title 28 gives the Attorney General power to appoint
and remove all Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and § 547(5) requires each U.S. Attorney to
"make such reports as the Attorney General may direct." Pursuant to this authority,
the Justice Department requires all U.S. Attorneys to submit statistics on the filing and
disposition of all civil and criminal cases, as well as the nature and disposition of all
civil and criminal investigations in which any attorney spends at least one hour of
time. See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 20, § 3-16.100. The Department further
provides periodic directives and guidelines for the handling of particular cases.
37 For example, all prosecutions for income tax crimes require prior Justice De-
partment approval, and the IRS refers its cases directly to the Tax Division rather than
to local U.S. Attorneys. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.70 (2002).
38 28 U.S.C. § 547.
39 See Tobin Romero, Note, Liberal Discovery on Selective Prosecution Claims: Fulfling
the Promise of EqualJustice, 84 GEO. L.J. 2043, 2044-46 (1996) (explaining why courts
defer to the prosecutor's judgment on who to prosecute).
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legislate with respect to individual cases. 40 As a consequence, judges
and executive branch officials are forced to apply generalized legisla-
tion to the quite specific-and often unforeseeable-factual settings
in which actual cases and controversies arise. Just as judges often re-
fine legislative pronouncements through statutory interpretation, so
do prosecutors when they exercise prosecutorial discretion in decid-
ing whether or not to pursue a particular case. The inevitability of
prosecutorial discretion is thus taken as axiomatic.
In a tacit acknowledgement of these circumstances, the Supreme
Court has, in a sense, ratified broad prosecutorial discretion. In
United States v. Batchelder,' the Court reviewed a defendant's convic-
tion for being a felon in possession of a firearm. In an odd set of
circumstances, two overlapping provisions of the Omnibus Crime Act
of 1968 prohibited the exact same conduct. 42 Not surprisingly, prose-
cutors indicted the defendant, who was subsequently convicted, under
the provision authorizing the more severe punishment.43 Although
the Seventh Circuit had originally affirmed the conviction, it re-
manded the case for resentencing, 44 explaining that it had "serious
doubts about the constitutionality of two statutes that provide differ-
ent penalties for identical conduct.'' 45 The Seventh Circuit identified
three possible constitutional infirmities. First, the court noted the
oddity of two statutory provisions criminalizing the same conduct but
with varying penalties, explaining that this discrepancy failed to pro-
vide the defendant with fair notice, and thus might have rendered the
statutes unconstitutionally vague. 46 Second, the court opined that the
lack of fair notice implicated a host of other due process and equal
protection concerns, perhaps the most important being "excessive
prosecutorial discretion." 47 Finally, the court found that the existence
of two identical statutes "constitute [d] an impermissible delegation of
congressional authority, to prosecutors. ' 48
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the Seventh Circuit's anal-
ysis. The Court held that it:
40 Indeed, the Constitution expressly prohibits bills of attainder, which seek to
criminalize specific individuals, and ex post facto laws, which attempt to criminalize
behavior after it occurs. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
41 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
42 Id. at 115-16.
43 Id. at 116.
44 United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 636 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S.
114 (1979).
45 Id. at 633-34.
46 Id. at 631.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 631-34.
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[H]as long recognized that when an act violates more than one
criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under either so
long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants.
Whether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a
grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor's
discretion. 49
The Court refused to characterize the impact of the dual provi-
sions as empowering "the Government to predetermine ultimate crim-
inal sanctions."50 Although the Court acknowledged the Seventh
Circuit's concern about the existence of the "impermissible delega-
tion to the Executive Branch of the Legislature's responsibility to fix
criminal penalties,"5' it noted that broad discretion has historically re-
sided within the office of prosecutor. "The provisions at issue plainly
demarcate the range of penalties that prosecutors and judges may
seek and impose. In light of that specificity," the Court explained, "the
power that Congress has delegated to those officials is no broader
than the authority they routinely exercise in enforcing the criminal
laws. "52
Although neither the exercise ofjudicial nor prosecutorial discre-
tion has ever been deemed illegitimate, concerns inevitability arise at
the margins. Critics occasionally berate as "activist" judges who stray
too far from the written law in deciding cases. 53 Similarly, prosecutors
who engage in selective prosecution, or who seek to cast a case in such
a way as to create (or to avoid) criminal liability, come under the same
sort of condemnation. 54
The prosecutor also controls the decision with respect to the
number of charges a defendant will confront.55 He may decide to
prosecute a defendant for twenty bank burglaries, ten burglaries, or
just one burglary. Similarly, a prosecutor may decide to.prosecute for
conspiracy as well as for burglary.5 6 The charging decision rests en-
tirely upon the prosecutor's shoulders, often constrained only by the
49 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979) (citations omitted).
50 Id. at 125.
51 Id. at 125-26.
52 Id. at 126.
53 See David Luban, The Warren Court and the Concept of a Right, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 7, 14 (1999).
54 See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies,
77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713 (1999).
55 Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 126.
56 In many jurisdictions, it is possible for a defendant to be convicted and sen-
tenced for both conspiracy and the underlying crime. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL
LAW § 6.5(h) (3d ed. 2000). The Model Penal Code has limited the court's ability to
sentence for both. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(1)(b) cmt. (1985).
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factual predicate. The number of charges may affect a jury's percep-
tion of the defendant and may ultimately affect the judge's sentence.
These real-world considerations contribute to the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.
The broad discretion in the charging decision directly impacts
sentencing in those jurisdictions, such as the federal system, which
have mandatory sentencing guidelines, or sentencing statutes with
minimum and maximum sentences. By choosing to prosecute a rob-
bery as an "armed robbery," the trial judge may be forced to sentence
a defendant, if convicted, under a mandatory sentence provision that
is applicable whenever a defendant commits a crime while armed. 57
Prosecutorial decisions to charge a violation of a particular statute
may affect sentencing in other ways. Sentencing enhancement provi-
sions, such as those found in the "armed career offender" guideline, 58
require that a sentence be enhanced only if the prosecutor chooses to
allege and prove prior convictions.59 Thus, the prosecutor's choices
at the initiation of a case have a substantial effect on the defendant's
ultimate sentence.
The concern in either forum ought to be the availability of discre-
tion without corresponding safeguards. Guidelines exist to cabin un-
toward judicial decisionmaking, and the tradition of written opinions
and appellate review help to make the process more transparent. 60
The principal difficulty with respect to prosecutorial discretion is that
it operates virtually without review, and traditionally without an articu-
lation of the reasons for deciding to forgo a prosecution. To this end,
the primary concern is not the exercise of discretion in and of itself,
but instead the standardless, arbitrary exercise of discretion. Absent
an explanation by the prosecutor, it may appear to the public that a
decision to forgo one case and to pursue another is capricious. In
particular, high profile cases may lead to charges of prosecutorial ma-
liciousness. As these decisions whether to pursue an indictment are
largely immune from review and (quite properly) do not take place in
the public's view, fairness and equity concerns inevitably arise. Despite
57 See generally Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Ef-
fectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 67-73 (1993) (stating
that determinate sentencing reform, which centers on multiple factors for sentenc-
ing, is undercut by mandating sentences that often focus on a single factor).
58 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2000).
59 Id.
60 See Timothy W. Floyd, Literature for Lauyers and Judges, 29 TEX. TECH L. REV.
967, 972 (1998) (reviewing BARRY R. SCHALLER, A VISIoN OF AMERICAN LAW: JUDGING
LAW, LITERATURE, AND THE STORIES WE TELL (1997), and citing Schaller's guidelines
for judicial decisionmaking).
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those fears, however, some standards do in fact exist. Accordingly, the
following section will discuss some of the publicly available policies
that may serve to cabin prosecutorial discretion.
C. A Brief Overview of Federal Declination Policies
Criminal offenses ordinarily come to the notice of prosecutors in
one of two ways: either through the efforts of law enforcement investi-
gators, or as the result of victim or witness self-reporting. Investigatory
authorities, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), exercise a substantial
amount of discretion in determining whether, and how, to conduct a
criminal investigation. The criminal investigation, however, is but the
first step on a long journey to criminal prosecution. Prior to becom-
ing an actual criminal "case," the alleged criminal conduct of a poten-
tial defendant, which is denoted as a "matter," must first be referred
to the local United States Attorney's office for a determination as to
whether prosecution is warranted. Federal investigative agencies such
as the DEA, FBI, or the Immigration and Naturaliiation Service (INS),
routinely make the bulk of such referrals.6 1
Without question, not all of these referrals result in criminal pros-
ecution. Federal prosecutors, after all, have limited resources and
must allocate them accordingly. Moreover, evidentiary, procedural,
or other policy-oriented impediments may exist that counsel against
pursuing prosecution and formal indictment in any given case. While
a prosecutor may wish to pursue a notorious gun case, for example, a
botched search that the prosecutor knows will result in suppression of
key evidence may lead to a declination. Similarly, physical evidence
may be lost or mishandled, rendering it useless for trial, or key wit-
nesses may recant, destroying a prosecutor's case. Consequently, fed-
eral prosecutors may decline to prosecute matters referred to them
based on a variety of concerns. Despite the wide latitude federal pros-
ecutors enjoy in deciding whether or not to pursue indictment, how-
ever, certain policies do exist to direct their decisions.
Identifiable criminal declination policies serve as a guide to fed-
eral prosecutors when deciding whether to move forward with prose-
cution on matters referred to them.62 The individual U.S. Attorneys'
offices put in place the bulk of those declination policies-many of
which are doubtless shaped by the character of the local community.
These policies are often difficult to unearth, however. The individual
61 Of all such referrals, the FBI makes 30%, the DEA 15%, and the INS 11%. See
infra Table 9.
62 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 20, §§ 9-2.020, 2.111.
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offices often argue (and sometimes with good reason) that the release
of intra-office declination policies may encourage criminal behavior at
the margins and may inform the defense bar as to how it may pitch
certain cases in an effort to avoid formal criminal charges.63 Nor do
prosecutors believe it good public policy to announce that they will
not pursue seemingly trivial crimes. Such pronouncements may foil
deterrence efforts and undermine public confidence in the law. Addi-
tionally, the publication of such policies may encourage defendants to
appeal whenever they believe they may have been treated differently
from similarly situated defendants who may not have been prosecuted
at all. Once written and made public, policies have a way of taking on
a life of their own, and any attempts to change them may be fraught
with difficulty.
Nevertheless, the Justice Department (and various other federal
agencies possessing prosecutorial authority) has made public certain
general prosecutorial guidelines. As outlined in greater detail below,
the purposes of such policies essentially are to maximize the efficient
use of prosecutorial resources by focusing them on the most serious
offenses that stand a reasonable chance of resulting in a conviction,
while at the same time ensuring that important federal interests are
vindicated. Thus, declination policies have both pragmatic, as well as
aspirational, components.
In addition to providing guidance to federal prosecutors in the
exercise of their prosecutorial discretion, similar policies govern re-
lated activities of many of the executive agencies that have administra-
tive and investigatory jurisdiction over regulations containing criminal
penalty provisions. As a result, such agencies often are the first to
become aware of potential criminal wrongdoing through their investi-
gations. Once made aware of suspected crimes, they must then deter-
mine whether to refer the matter to the relevant U.S. Attorney's office
for consideration as to whether criminal prosecution ought to be pur-
sued. In many cases, these referral policies act both as a means to
encourage compliance with governmental regulations, as well as a
means to ferret out criminal wrongdoing without having to expend
additional agency resources. 6 4 Thus, referral policies, like declination
policies, serve to focus limited federal resources in the most efficient,
effective, and judicious manner possible.
63 Romero, supra note 39, at 2046 n.18.
64 Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of
Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 560-61 (2003).
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1. Basic Criminal Declination Policies of the U.S. Department of
Justice
The following section will summarize many of the federal govern-
ment's most important, publicly available declination policies.
a. U.S. Attorneys' Manual
The U.S. Attorneys' Manual (Manual) provides general depart-
mental guidelines that U.S. Attorneys' offices are expected to follow.
The Manual creates a sort of "general handbook of instruction" for
the individual offices to achieve some degree of uniformity in the en-
forcement of federal law. Uniformity in federal prosecutions, how-
ever, is plainly not a hallmark of the Manual, as the guidelines are
quite broad. For example, pursuant to § 9-2.020 of the Manual, a
"United States Attorney is authorized to decline prosecution in any
case referred directly to him/her by an agency unless a statute pro-
vides otherwise. ' 65 The Manual thus explicitly recognizes the inher-
ent authority of any prosecutor to forgo prosecution in an individual
case. The Manual further provides that an "attorney for the govern-
ment should commence or recommend Federal prosecution if he/she
believes that the person's conduct constitutes a Federal offense and
that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and
sustain a conviction .... ,,66
In other words, the expectation is that where legal evidence of an
offense exists, a prosecutor is expected to initiate criminal proceed-
ings. However, a federal prosecutor may decline to prosecute if he or
she believes that (1) "[n]o substantial Federal interest would be
served by [the] prosecution," (2) the defendant "is subject to effective
prosecution in another jurisdiction," or (3) "[t] here exists an ade-
quate non-criminal alternative to prosecution." 67 These three general
rules of thumb are important in that they form the foundation upon
which many of the general declination policies are built. In turn, the
Manual provides for "relevant considerations" with respect to making
determinations as to each of the three grounds stated above. 68
i. The Existence of a Substantial Federal Interest
With respect to whether a substantial federal interest would be
served by prosecuting the accused, a federal prosecutor is to consider
65 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 20, § 9-2.020.
66 Id. § 9-27.220.
67 Id.
68 Id. § 9-27.200.
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the priorities of federal law enforcement, the "nature and seriousness
of the offense," the "deterrent effect of prosecution," the defendant's
culpability and criminal history, as well as the defendant's willingness
to cooperate with authorities. 69 Finally, the prosecutor is to also con-
sider "[t] he probable sentence or other consequences if the person is
convicted. '70 Thus, these more general instructions provide prosecu-
tors plenty of wiggle room in deciding whether to formally pursue a
matter. This opportunity to exercise discretion relatively unfettered
by Justice Department authorities has often been criticized by com-
mentators who argue that, without proper guidelines cabining
prosecutorial decisionmaking, that process may become one that is
seemingly arbitrary and rife with potential for abuse. 71
ii. The Availability of Prosecution in Another Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court arguably has expanded the somewhat arbi-
trary nature of prosecutorial discretion by interpreting the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy so as to permit
both state and federal prosecutors to pursue the same offender with
respect to the same criminal conduct.72 This "separate sovereigns"
doctrine grants considerable leverage to the entities pursuing prose-
cution.73 As a practical matter, however, while both sovereigns can
undertake a prosecution of the same defendant, resource scarcity dic-
tates that such multiple-sovereign prosecutions will seldom occur.74
Hence, the federal government will often acquiesce in a state's deci-
sion to pursue a criminal prosecution unless an important national
interest is at stake. 75
With respect to whether an otherwise federal defendant is to be
prosecuted in another jurisdiction, the federal prosecutor is to con-
sider ,[t]he strength of the other jurisdiction's interest in prosecu-
tion," "[t]he other jurisdiction's ability and willingness to prosecute
effectively, and [t]he probable sentence or other consequences" to
the defendant if convicted.76 This particular consideration is con-
69 Id. § 9-27.230.
70 Id.
71 Podgor, supra note 5, at 1515-20.
72 Michael A. Dawson, Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual Sovereignty
Doctrine, 102 YALE L.J. 281, 281 (1992).
73 Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88-90 (1985).
74 Jon J. Jensen & Kerry S. Rosenquist, Satisfaction of a Compelling Governmental
Interest or Simply Two Convictions for the Price of One?, 69 N.D. L. REV. 915, 925-26
(1994).
75 U.S. ArroRNEvs' MANuAL, supra note 20, § 9-2.031.
76 Id. § 9-27.240.
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trolled by the so-called Petite Policy,7 7 which governs "the exercise of
discretion by appropriate officers of the Department of Justice in de-
termining whether to bring a federal prosecution based on substan-
tially the same act(s) or transactions involved in a prior state or
federal proceeding." 78 The Petite Policy is in large part an artifact of
the substantial increase in federal jurisdiction over traditional com-
mon law crimes, which may also be prosecuted by state authorities. 79
Early in the nation's history, federal jurisdiction over criminal
matters was fairly narrow-relegated to federal lands, crimes commit-
ted upon the high seas, exclusive federal offenses (e.g., treason, coun-
terfeiting, and tax violations) and military offenses.80 The general
police power was deemed to be largely a matter of state concern. As
the federal government's tentacles reached out to touch individual
behavior, however, so too did they extend to encompass the prosecu-




Regardless of how one may feel about the significant expansion
of federal criminal law jurisdiction during the past thirty years, it is
clear that a great deal of overlap exists between state and federal law
enforcement authority. In light of such overlap, the Petite Policy
evolved as a purely practical means of allocating prosecutorial re-
sources. The purpose of this policy is to vindicate substantial federal
interests through appropriate federal prosecutions; to protect persons
charged with criminal conduct from the burdens associated with mul-
tiple prosecutions and punishments for substantially the same act(s)
or transaction (s) ;82 to promote efficient utilization of Department re-
77 The name of the policy is derived from Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529
(1960), in which the Supreme Court held that because the state and federal govern-
ments are separate and distinct sovereigns, they could both pursue prosecutions for
similar conduct without running afoul of double jeopardy protections. See also Ri-
naldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 27 (1977) (finding the policy serves an important
purpose in protecting the citizen from any unfairness associated with successive prose-
cutions based on the same conduct).
78 U.S. AyoatRNEVs' MANUAL, supra note 20, § 9-2.031.
79 Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Legislating Federal Crime and Its Conse-
quences: Dual Prosecutions: A Model for Concurrent Federal Jurisdiction, 543 ANNALS Am.
AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci . 72, 75 (1996).
80 Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 16-17.
81 Id. at 16.
82 Especially in view of the fact that the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply to multiple prose-
cutions for the "same offense" by the state and federal governments, because they are
.separate sovereigns" and thus are presumed to be vindicating different interests. See
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 128-29 (1959) (holding that the Double Jeopardy
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sources; and to promote coordination and cooperation between fed-
eral and state prosecutors.
This policy precludes the initiation or continuation of a federal
prosecution following a prior state or federal prosecution based on
substantially the same act(s) or transaction(s) unless three substantive
prerequisites are satisfied: first, the matter must involve a substantial
federal interest; second, the prior prosecution must have left that in-
terest demonstrably unvindicated; and third, applying the same test
that is applicable to all federal prosecutions, the government must be-
lieve that the defendant's conduct constitutes a federal offense, and
that the admissible evidence probably will be sufficient to obtain and
sustain a conviction by an unbiased trier of fact.8 3 In addition, there is
a procedural prerequisite to be satisfied-that is, the prosecution
must be approved by the appropriate Assistant Attorney General. 84
iii. The Availability of Alternative Sanctions
Finally, with respect to the availability of non-criminal alternatives
to prosecution, a federal prosecutor is to consider the type of alterna-
tive sanctions available, their effectiveness, and "[t]he effect of non-
criminal disposition on federal law enforcement interests. 8s5 This
principle has become increasingly important, as civil alternatives such
as fines and restitution have been embraced as providing a more effec-
tive, cost-efficient means of vindicating federal interests.
b. The Policies of Individual U.S. Attorneys' Offices
In addition to the general declination policies outlined in the
Manual, each U.S. Attorney's office may have its own formal, written
declination policies,86 as well as unwritten traditions passed down over
time in the form of non-binding guidance from supervising attorneys
or trainers.8 7 At a minimum, each office presumably will have infor-
mal policies that arise from office culture or that reflect local bar prac-
Clause does not bar state robbery trial following acquittal on a federal charge of
robbery).
83 U.S. ATroRNEvs' MANuAL, supra note 20, § 9-2.031.
84 Id.
85 Id. § 9-27.250.
86 See, e.g., U.S Attorney, E.D. Wis., United States Attorney's Policy Manual for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin (2000) (on file with author).
87 Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff 55 STAN. L
REv. 29, 56-57 (2002).
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tices or relevant community needs.88 These policies will serve to guide
prosecutors working in that particular office and may serve as an im-
portant constraint on each attorney's discretion. The practice of law,
after all, is not performed in a vacuum. Lawyers in a particular U.S.
Attorney's office generally hail from that district, and thus are nur-
tured in a particular legal climate unique to that jurisdiction. What
juries and federal prosecutors deem important in a small district that
encompasses rural communities may be quite different from those in
a large, urban district. As a consequence, even if the policies are not
expressly recorded, individual offices will have declination guidelines
that arise from custom or practice. These internal policies ostensibly
do not depart drastically from the general principles the Manual sets
forth.
To be sure, the policies do specify particulars depending on the
resources the office commands and the nature and frequency of cer-
tain offenses that occur within the office's jurisdiction.89 For exam-
ple, smaller U.S. Attorneys' offices may not have minimum thresholds
for prosecuting certain drug offenses inasmuch as they occur rela-
tively infrequently in the jurisdiction.90 In contrast, larger U.S. Attor-
neys' offices located in urban areas may be overwhelmed with drug
offenses, and therefore will allocate prosecutorial resources only for
the most serious of these offenses. Consequently, they may have an
intra-office policy of prosecuting only drug cases involving x-grams of
crack cocaine, while declining to prosecute drug cases involving a
lesser amount. The difficulty in evaluating such policies, however, is
that they are not routinely available to the public. As previously
noted, U.S. Attorneys' offices are reluctant to become embroiled in
disputes with defendants who are prosecuted-even though they may
not fall within the office's traditional guidelines. Similarly, the offices
are wary of making guidelines available to defense attorneys who will
then seek to pitch their cases as falling outside the guidelines' scope.
It is difficult to evaluate such claims, however, because researchers
only have access to anecdotal experience of prosecutors.
88 Theodora Galacatos, Note, The United States Department of Justice Environmental
Crimes Section: A Case Study of Inter- and Intrabranch Conflict Over Congressional Oversight
and the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 64 FoRDHAM L. REv. 587, 599-602 (1995).
89 Frank 0. Bowman III, The Quality of Mercy Must be Restrained, and Other Lessons
in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 679, 739.
90 Dan Haude, Comment, Ohio's New Sentencing Guidelines: A "Middleground" Ap-
proach to Crack Sentencing, 29 AKRON L. REv. 607, 622 (1996).
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c. The Antitrust Division
The U.S. Attorneys' offices, of course, are not the sole
prosecutorial agencies within the Justice Department. Other divisions
under the umbrella of Main Justice also have criminal law enforce-
ment authority. For instance, the Department's Antitrust Division
handles prosecutions of criminal violations of the Sherman Act.9 1
The Antitrust Division has quite specific declination policies, but they
are designated as "leniency" policies because they encompass a wide
range of behaviors. Although the "Corporate Leniency Policy" is of
particular importance to the Antitrust Division, it also has a "Leniency
Policy for Individuals" as well. 92 The Corporate Leniency Policy was
established on August 10, 1993, and provides that a corporation can
avoid criminal prosecution for antitrust violations by confessing its
role in the illegal activities, fully cooperating with the Division, and
meeting the other specified conditions.9 3 This policy is of particular
importance as it serves not only to provide guidance to prosecutors,
but to inform corporations of the proper behavior as well.9 4 To this
end, the policy is made public to influence corporate behavior on the
theory that certain actions will be deterred and, even if not deterred,
whistleblowers will be incentivised to come forward with information.
91 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
92 Deputy Assistant Attorney General Gary Spratling, Making Companies an Offer
They Shouldn't Refuse: The Antitrust Division's Corporate Leniency Policy-An Up-
date, Address Before the Bar Association of the District of Columbia's 35th Annual
Symposium on Associations and Antitrust (Feb. 16, 1999), available at www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/speeches/2247pdf.
93 See ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY
(1993), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.htm.
94 Pursuant to the Policy, the specified conditions are as follows:
1. At the time the corporation comes forward to report the illegal activity,
the Division has not received information about the illegal activity being re-
ported from any other source;
2. The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal activity being reported,
took prompt and effective action to terminate its part in the activity;
3. The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness
and provides full, continuing and complete cooperation to the Division
throughout the investigation;
4. The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, as opposed to iso-
lated confessions of individual executives or officials;
5. Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to injured parties; and
6. The corporation did not coerce another party to participate in the illegal
activity and clearly was not the leader in, or originator of, the activity.
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Recently, the renowned auction house Christie's took advantage
of the Antitrust Division's Corporate Leniency Policy in order to avoid
criminal prosecution for conspiring with its principal competitor,
Sotheby's auction house, to "fix... commission rates charged to sell-
ers of works of art, jewelry and furniture at auctions" around the
world. 95 Presumably made aware of the Justice Department's Corpo-
rate Leniency Policy, Christie's reported the criminal conduct first to
the Division, thereby qualifying for the first-in-the-door benefit and
avoiding harsh punishment. Sotheby's, in contrast, was sentenced to
pay a $45 million fine.9 6
In addition to the Corporate Leniency Policy, the Antitrust Divi-
sion also has a "Leniency Policy for Individuals," issued on August 10,
1994, as an update to an earlier version. 97 This policy provides the
same benefit for complying with the following three conditions prior
to the commencement of a criminal investigation:
(1) At the time the individual comes forward to report the illegal
activity, the Division has not received information about the illegal
activity being reported from any other source; (2) The individual
reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and provides
full, continuing and complete cooperation to the Division through-
out the investigation; and (3) The individual did not coerce another
party to participate in the illegal activity and clearly was not the
leader in, or originator of, the activity.9 8
Although this policy "applies to all individuals who approach the
Division on their own behalf, [and] not as part of a corporate proffer
or confession, to seek leniency for reporting illegal antitrust activity,"
apparently neither of the former Chairmen of Sotheby's or Christie's
qualified inasmuch as they eventually were indicted for price-fixing
violations.99
d. Policies Regarding Charging Organizations
Although well beyond the scope of this study, it is worth noting
that Main Justice can, and sometimes does, modify existing declina-
tion policies and then foist them upon the individual litigating divi-
sions. On June 16, 1999, for example, Deputy Attorney General Eric
95 Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofiustice, Former Chairmen of Sotheby's and Chris-
tie's Auction Houses Indicted in International Price-Fixing Conspiracy (May 2, 2001),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2001/8128.pdf.
96 See id.
97 See ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LENIENCY POLICY FOR INDIVIDU-
ALs (1994), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0092.htm.
98 Id.
99 See Press Release, supra note 95, at 2.
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Holder issued a memorandum on bringing criminal charges against
corporations to all the heads of the various components of the Depart-
ment of Justice, as well as to all then-serving U.S. Attorneys.10 0 This
memorandum included as an attachment a document entitled "Fed-
eral Prosecution of Corporations," which was intended to "provide...
guidance as to what factors should generally inform a prosecutor in
making the decision whether to charge a corporation in a particular
case." 10 1 The presumptive goal of the Holder Memorandum was to
provide guidelines to all prosecutors and to ensure the uniform treat-
ment of corporate targets.1 0 2 First and foremost, the non-binding pol-
icy asserts:
Corporations should not be treated leniently because of their artifi-
cial nature nor should they be subject to harsher treatment. Vigor-
ous enforcement of the criminal laws against corporate wrongdoers,
where appropriate, results in great benefits for law enforcement
and the public, particularly in the area of white-collar crime. In-
dicting corporations for wrongdoing enables the government to ad-
dress and be a force for positive change of corporate culture, alter
corporate behavior, and prevent, discover, and punish white-collar
crime. 10
3
100 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy U.S. Attorney General, to All Compo-




103 Id. I.A. Among factors to be considered in charging corporations are:
1. The nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to
the public, and applicable policies and priorities, if any, governing the prose-
cution of corporations for particular categories of crime;
2. The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the
complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by corporate
management;
3. The corporation's history of similar conduct, including prior criminal,
civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it;
4. The corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if neces-
sary, the waiver of the corporate attorney-client and work product privileges;
5. The existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance program;
6. The corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts to implement an
effective corporate compliance program or to improve an existing one, to
replace responsible management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to
pay restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant government agencies;
7. Collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm to sharehold-
ers and employees not proven personally culpable; and
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According to the memorandum, the "fundamental questions any
prosecutor should ask are: is the corporation's compliance program
well designed? and, does the corporation's compliance program
work?" 10 4 The answers to these questions ultimately can help deter-
mine whether a corporation's compliance program will move a fed-
eral prosecutor to decline prosecution. These criteria are significant
in that they reflect general policies with respect to declination, and
are translatable even to assessing criminal conduct committed by an
individual. The mere existence of this policy shows that the Justice
Department can provide more robust guidance to prosecutors, re-
gardless of the jurisdiction in which they practice.
2. Sample Agency Referral Declination Policies
As previously noted, in addition to the criminal declination poli-
cies of the Justice Department and the various U.S. Attorneys' offices,
many executive agencies have referral policies under which they will
decline to refer a case for prosecution, provided that the defendant
has complied with certain criteria, and that there are good policy rea-
sons for not prosecuting the case. Although I do not wish to outline
these myriad policies in exacting detail, a few of the more important
policies are summarized below.
a. Environmental Protection Agency
With increasing importance being placed on environmental
crimes, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has become an
ever more influential player in criminal prosecutions. On May 11,
2000, the EPA issued its final policy statement on "Incentives for Self-
Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Viola-
tions."' 0 5 Under this policy, "[w] hen a disclosure that meets the terms
and conditions of this Policy results in a criminal investigation, EPA
will generally not recommend criminal prosecution for the disclosing
entity, although the Agency may recommend prosecution for culpable
individuals and other entities." 1° 6 As with the Justice Department's
8. The adequacy of non-criminal remedies, such as civil or regulatory en-
forcement actions.
Id. II.A (internal citations omitted).
104 Id. VII.B.
105 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INCENTIVES FOR SELF-POLICING: DISCOVERY, DISCLOSURE,
CORRECTION AND PREVENTION OF VIOLATIONS (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/
enforcement/resources/policies/incentives/auditing/finalpolstate.pdf.
106 Id. at 14.
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corporate policies, the EPA focuses on prompt and voluntary disclo-
sure and self-reporting.107
b. Health and Human Services
On October 30, 1998, the Office of the Inspector General for the
Department of Health and Human Services, announced the recent
issuance of its "Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol." 10 8 The Protocol es-
sentially recapitulates the criteria set forth in the DOJ's Federal Prose-
cution of Corporations-especially with regard to voluntary and
timely disclosure and compliance programs. 109 Although the Proto-
col does not explicitly address under what circumstances it may de-
cline to refer a matter to the DOJ for criminal prosecution, it
nevertheless is clear that "[a] bonafide self-disclosure made before the
government has learned of the misconduct may well persuade Depart-
ment of Justice prosecutors to exercise leniency in deciding whether
to prosecute the provider, and, if so, which charges to bring."110
c. Internal Revenue Service
Unlike any other executive branch agency, the IRS wields defini-
tive power within its ambit of regulatory authority with respect to
whether a criminal case is filed."' With any other administrative or
executive agency, should that agency decline to refer a matter for
criminal prosecution, it is still possible for another agency with over-
lapping jurisdiction to refer the matter. With respect to criminal tax
fraud, however, only the IRS can refer and "sign off' on prosecutions
of criminal violations of our nation's tax laws. Thus, the IRS's Volun-
107 In order to qualify for the benefits of the policy, the entity (most likely an
organization) must meet nine criteria: (1) systematic discovery of the violation
through an Environmental Audit or a Compliance Management System; (2) voluntary
disclosure; (3) prompt disclosure; (4) discovery or disclosure prompted indepen-
dently of any government or third-party action; (5) correction and remediation; (6)
prevent reoccurrence; (7) no repeat violations; (8) violation did not actually and seri-
ously harm environment or pose imminent and substantial endangerment to public
health, or violate the specific terms of any order, consent agreement or plea agree-
ment; (9) cooperation. Id. at 16-28.
108 See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Publication of OIG's Self-Disclo-
sure Protocol, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,399-02 (Oct. 30, 1998).
109 Memorandum from Eric Holder, supra note 100, VI.A ("In determining
whether to charge a corporation, that corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate with the government's investigation may
be relevant factors.").
110 Shelly R. Slade, Truth and Its Consequences: Should You Voluntarily Disclose Overbil-
lings to Law Enforcement?, HEALTH LAW, June 2000, at 36, 40 (emphasis added).
111 U.S. ATToRNEYs' MANuAL, supra note 20, §§ 6-4.110, -4.120 to -4.122.
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tary Disclosure Policy is, in effect, binding on the DOJ (but it does
not, as discussed briefly below, afford defendants any rights).
The IRS Policy, like those policies canvassed above, is to defer
criminal prosecution of those individuals or organizations that volun-
tarily disclose their criminal wrongdoing in a timely, honest, and com-
prehensive manner. In United States v. Tenzer,' 12 the district court
dismissed a four-count information charging the defendant with un-
lawfully, willingly and knowingly failing to file his taxes. The lower
court found that the defendant "had satisfied the IRS's voluntary dis-
closure policy and therefore was immune from prosecution."' 13 The
Second Circuit, however, reversed, holding that the defendant had
not complied with the policy's provision that the defendant make a
bona fide arrangement to pay his back taxes. 114 The Second Circuit
found that the defendant had made a mere offer to pay, rather than
actually arranging to pay.1 15
The Second Circuit took pains to note that, even if the policy did
apply, "neither Tenzer nor the public may reasonably rely on [it]" in-
asmuch as it simply was a policy and not a rule or a regulation. 116
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit did note that "the government is ob-
ligated to negotiate in good faith with the taxpayer toward the end of
achieving an arrangement to pay," and therefore "may not withhold
its assent [to the proffered arrangement] capriciously or in bad
faith."'1 7 The IRS must afford a taxpayer, who has acted in reliance
upon the voluntary disclosure policy, a reasonable opportunity to sat-
isfy all of the conditions of that policy, including a payment plan.118
D. Relationship of Declination Policies to Prosecutorial Discretion
At bottom, however, declination guidelines are simply that-
namely, suggestions to assist prosecutors in making the final decision
whether to proceed with a case. Despite the existence of even formal,
written guidelines, individual prosecutors have long enjoyed broad
prosecutorial discretion. 119 The United States Supreme Court has
ruled that "so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe
112 127 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 1997).
113 Id. at 226.
114 Id. at 227.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 228.
117 Id. at 227.
118 Id. at 277. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., REVISED IRS VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
PRACTICE (2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/ojjid=1043
61.html.
119 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
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that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the deci-
sion whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring
before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion." 120 Be-
cause "[s]uch factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's
general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities,
and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement
plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are
competent to undertake," 121 the Court explained, "courts properly
[are] hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute." 122
Nevertheless, the broad discretion afforded to prosecutors is not
"unfettered."'123 In addition to the formal and informal guidelines
that guide decisionmaking, certain other principles influence deci-
sionmaking as well. According to the Court, for example, "selectivity
in the enforcement of criminal laws is . . . subject to constitutional
constraints."' 24 In particular, the decision to prosecute may not be
deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, relig-
ion, or other arbitrary classification, including the exercise of pro-
tected statutory and constitutional rights. 125
In light of these constraints on the manner in which prosecutors
select cases to prosecute, they are also prohibited from prosecuting
out of a vindictive motive. Where selectivity may deny equal protec-
tion under the law, a vindictive prosecution violates due process.126
Although it is generally presumed that prosecutors act in good faith, a
presumption of vindictiveness will arise where "a defendant is re-in-
dicted, particularly when a prosecutor increases the number or sever-
ity of charges after the defendant has appealed his or her
conviction." 127 Nevertheless, as this example illustrates, claims of vin-
dictive prosecution rarely occur in the pretrial stage, and are seldom
successful if raised after a full-blown trial.128
In addition to the broad discretion they enjoy at the time of
charging, federal prosecutors also enjoy substantial discretion at the
sentencing stage, for it also is "the prosecutor's prerogative to recom-
mend leniency under the Sentencing Guidelines" in the form of a
120 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
121 Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.
122 Id. at 608.
123 Id. (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979)).
124 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979).
125 Id. at 125 n.9
126 See Chris Zimmerman, Prosecutorial Discretion, 89 GEO. LJ. 1229, 1233 (2001).
127 Id. at 1238-39.
128 Id. at 1239-41.
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downward departure. 129 TheFederal Sentencing Guidelines were, of
course, designed to develop rational and coherent sentencing policies
for the federal criminal justice system. Specifically, they are intended
to reduce unwarranted sentencing disparity and promote proportion-
ality. °30 As Professor Richard Frase has noted, however, "[p]olice and
prosecutors can evade even the strictest plea bargaining and sentenc-
ing controls by simply not arresting or charging certain offenders, or
not charging certain offenses."'' 3 This has led Professor Albert W. Al-
schuler to comment that "a policy of restricting judicial but not
prosecutorial discretion is incoherent."1 32 In other words, formal
guidelines limiting prosecutorial discretion may be just as necessary
for the criminal justice system as those which bind judges-particu-
larly in the context of existing restrictions on judicial discretion. As
former Sentencing Commissioner Ilene Nagel has observed:
The principal goal of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the
U.S. sentencing guidelines is the structuring ofjudicial discretion so
as to reduce unwarranted disparity in the federal sentencing pro-
cess. Yet, students of sentencing now recognize that prosecutorial
discretion, in charging and in the plea negotiation process, poses
obstacles to achieving this goal. 13 3
Whether criminal declination policies and agency referral poli-
cies can, in fact, further the goals articulated by the Sentencing Re-
form Act' 3 4 is an open question, but nevertheless an intriguing one.
What is clear, however, is that more information is needed about dec-
lination policies to gain a better understanding of how, and whether,
they influence prosecutors in-their decisionmaking process.
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF DECLINATION TRENDS
Prosecutors act as the designated gatekeepers of the criminal jus-
tice system. While an Assistant U.S. Attorney's decision to undertake a
129 Id. at 1232.
130 See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2000) (requiring the Sentencing Commission to
"provide certainty and fairness" and avoid "unwarranted sentencing disparities among
defendants with similar records" when establishing sentencing policies); see also 28
U.S.C. § 994(f) (requiring the Sentencing Commission to pay "particular attention to
the requirements of subsection 991 (b) (1) (B)" when promulgating guidelines).
131 Frase, supra note 15, at 247.
132 Albert W. Alschuler, Monarch, Lackey, or Judge, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 723, 723
(1993).
133 Ilene H. Nagel & StephenJ. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study
of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L.
REv. 501, 501 (1992).
134 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2000).
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prosecution is made in the light of day, and thus subject to the scru-
tiny of his peers, judges, juries, and the public, the decision to forgo
prosecution is seldom amenable to oversight. The discussion of the
various declination policies was intended to provide a context in
which to view the empirical data. Those policies permit the data to be
understood as the reflection of a complex process that is largely hid-
den from public view.
Indeed, declination data are notoriously difficult to unearth and
pose certain limitations that will be discussed below. The principal
source for the data analyzed in this study is EOUSA, which is a compo-
nent within the Justice Department. EOUSA collects a variety of data
from each of the U.S. Attorneys' offices, including information on de-
clined matters. AUSAs are required, as a matter of course, to keep
track of all matters for which they spend at least one hour of attorney
time, and have further been instructed to record the reasons for their
decisions to decline prosecution in individual cases.13- The relevant
form identifies thiry-four reasons for declining to pursue a particular
case. 1
36
Several caveats must be mentioned with respect to this data. First,
the Department does not require AUSAs to record declination rea-
sons for matters on which they spend less than an hour consider-
ing. 13 7 Thus, many seemingly trivial matters, or those that are facially
problematic, are not captured within the data. It is unfortunate that
such information is not captured, as it might provide important gui-
dance to those seeking to identify problems within investigative agen-
cies. If, for example, matters are consistently being referred that have
obvious evidentiary or other legal problems, it might be possible to
discover lapses in training or other blind spots among investigating
authorities.
Aside from this inherent limitation with the data, however, there
are two other significant caveats that must be noted. Assistant federal
prosecutors tend to be busy professionals, and thus may fail to record
each matter for which they spend at least an hour of time. As a conse-
135 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Data Dictionary: Variables For
Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases Filed, Fiscal Year 1994, at http://fjsrc.urban.org/
noframe/dd/ddintro.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2003); see also U.S. ATTORNEYS' MAN-
uAL, supra note 20, § 9-27.270(A).
136 These thirty-four "Primary Reasons for Declinations" cover a gamut of ratio-
nales for why a matter may not be pursued, including "Agency request," "Lack of
evidence of criminal intent," "Petite policy," "Statute of limitations," and "Witness
problems." See U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney Criminal Matter and Declination
Sheet (on file with author).
137 See supra note 135.
[VOL- 79:1
TRENDS IN FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL DECLINATIONS
quence, the recorded declinations may tend to be somewhat more
representative of complex matters that AUSAs spend slightly more
time examining. Similarly, given the rigidity of the declination cate-
gories prescribed by the Justice Department, and the nature of crimi-
nal matters themselves, AUSAs necessarily need to make interpretive
judgments. With respect to interpretive questions, a declination may
often be based on more than one ground, some of which may go un-
recorded purely for convenience's sake. In addition, while one AUSA
may choose to decline the case for one reason, and record it as such, a
different prosecutor may have declined the matter on other grounds.
Despite these obvious problems with the data set, however, the infor-
mation provided by individual AUSAs is still the largest and most com-
prehensive information regarding declinations available anywhere.
Although there are doubtless limitations to these data, 138 they
constitute the largest pool of information of its kind. The following
analysis focuses on matters received by prosecutors from an investiga-
tive agency. Once referred to a U.S. Attorney's office, such criminal
matters may be declined for prosecution, or they may become "cases"
that that will be pursued to a formal indictment stage, procedurally
dismissed by a court, or defaulted. It is important to note that the
data set does not include matters developed by investigative agencies,
but then never forwarded to prosecutors. To be included in this anal-
ysis, the matter must have been referred to a U.S. Attorney's office
(and, of course, the declination reasons must have been recorded by
the reviewing attorney). In addition, the data set fails to include mat-
ters that go unreported because they fail to consume even an hour of
attorney time. 139
A. Trends from 1994-2000
1. Criminal Case Filings, Matters, and Declinations
To provide some sort of background to the declination trend
data, it is worthwhile to note the number of criminal cases filed for
the relevant time period: 1994-2000.140 After all, to gain some per-
138 See generally Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Syracuse Univ., About
The Data: Federal Prosecutor Database, at http://trac.syr.edu/data/jus/eousaData.html
(last visited Sep 21, 2003) ("While these federal prosecutorial databases have some
limitations and specific problem areas, on the whole TRAC's analyses have generally
found the criminal data to be of relatively high quality as compared with other gov-
ernment administrative data sources.").
139 While a tally of such cases would be interesting to study, as a practical matter
there are no means available to retrieve such data.
140 The latest date for which data was available as of this writing was 1994-2000.
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spective, declinations must be viewed in the larger context of criminal
case filings, as many reasons for declining cases may exist-including
the existence of available resources, changes in national priorities, or
substantive legal changes. Thus, Table 1 reports the total number of
federal criminal cases filed during the period of 1994 through 2000,
as well as the principal means by which referred matters were
terminated.
TABLE 1. SUSPECTS IN CRIMINAL MATTERS 1994-2000141
Matters Matters Filings: Matters
Concluded By Terminated Prosecuted In Matters Percent of
U.S. Before U.S. U.S. District Declined For Matters
Year Attorney' 4 2  Magistrates Court Prosecution Declined
1994 94,980 9,754 50,802 34,424 36%
1995 102,309 10,710 55,703 35,896 35%
1996 98,454 8,684 56,938 32,832 33%
1997 99,459 10,007 60,383 29,069 29%
1998 106,022 12,243 64,993 28,786 27%
1999 113,933 14,545 68,384 31,004 27%
2000 117,450 13,916 73,090 30,444 26%
The first column lists those matters concluded by the U.S. Attor-
neys' offices, whether by filing a case in district court, litigating it
before a magistrate, or declining to prosecute it altogether. The sec-
ond column details those matters concluded by a federal magistrate
judge. The third column lists those cases actually filed in district
court, and the fourth column divulges the number of matters in
which AUSAs decided to forgo prosecution. As the table demon-
strates, criminal filings increased substantially over the covered pe-
riod, rising from 50,802 in 1994 to 73,090 in 2000-an increase of
roughly 44%. This finding is of particular interest because, over this
141 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL
CASE PROCESSING, 2000, 2001 NCJ 189737, app. at 28-29, available at http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fccpOO.pdf [hereinafter CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING]. This
time period was selected because it includes the latest year for which the necessary
data were available. These particular years are interesting because they encompass a
single President (William Clinton) and a lone Attorney General (Janet Reno). Thus,
policies coming from the upper echelons of government might be presumed to have
a certain degree of stability. That fact, in and of itself, makes the declination trends
all the more interesting.
142 Data reported here are for matters "concluded" during the federal fiscal years
tabulated regardless of when the matters were opened. Matters are concluded when
(1) a U.S. Attorney files a case in district court, or (2) a misdemeanor case is
concluded before a U.S. magistrate, or (3) a U.S. Attorney declines to prosecute the
matter. Id. at 17.
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same time period, a substantial drop in violent crime has been widely
reported. 143 Of course, one might argue that crime has dropped be-
cause (among other reasons) the government has been vigorously
pursuing the prosecution of criminal cases. As can be seen in the
trends reflected in the first column of the table, this increase in filings
also corresponds to a 24% increase (from 94,980 to 117,450) in the
number of matters concluded by the U.S. Attorneys' offices over the
1994-2000 period.' 44
The fourth and fifth columns, respectively, reflect the extent to
which federal prosecutors are able to take advantage of their consider-
able discretion to decline prosecutions. The fourth column details
the number of cases prosecutors' declined, while the final column
presents data for the proportion of matters where prosecution was de-
clined over the 1994-2000 period. A clear trend is evident: fewer mat-
ters were declined over this time-frame so that 36% of matters were
declined in 1994 and only 26% in 2000. This finding is particularly
interesting given that it occurred over a period when the number of
matters handled by the U.S. Attorneys' offices increased dramatically.
Overall, these figures suggest a negative association between the
number of matters referred to U.S. Attorneys and the proportion of
the matters they declined to prosecute. That is, when the U.S. Attor-
neys were dealing with fewer matters, they tended to decline a greater
proportion of them (i.e., more than one-third in 1994 when the num-
ber of matters was less than 100,000) whereas by 2000, they declined
to prosecute only about one quarter of matters and processed over
117,000. At first blush, this appears counterintuitive. One would ex-
pect that with an increase in the number of received matters, there
would be a corresponding increase in the number of declinations. Al-
though this represents a fairly substantial drop in the total number of
new matters declined, it still indicates that roughly a quarter of new
matters received will not proceed to indictment. The following sec-
tion will offer at least a partial explanation for the decrease in declina-
tions even as the number of matters increased.
2. Deployment of Available Resources
The findings presented above indicate a negative association be-
tween the propensity of U.S. Attorneys to decline to prosecute matters
and the total number of matters being handled by their offices. This
143 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S.. Dep't of Justice, Key Crime &Justice Facts at
a Glance, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/cv2.htm. (last modified Aug. 24,
2003).
144 CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 141, app. at 28 (Table A.3).
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means that, on the whole, U.S. Attorneys' offices prosecuted relatively
fewer matters when they had fewer matters with which to concern
themselves. Such a finding seems counterintuitive because, all other
things being equal, one would expect more resources (e.g., staff time
to investigate referrals) to be available for prosecuting matters when
there are fewer matters to deal with. However, it is possible that all
other things were not equal over the 1994-2000 time period. Specifi-
cally, it may have been that along with annual increases in the number
of matters referred came increases in the resources available to prose-
cute them. 14 5
a. Comparisons by District
One approach to testing this hypothesis is to compare districts
that process fewer matters annually with those that process a larger
number. This test assumes that the number of matters dealt with by a
district serves as a proxy indicator for the amount of resources availa-
ble to prosecute them; that is, larger districts have larger staffs and
bigger budgets, more experts in particular areas of the law, and other
potential advantages over smaller districts.
To this end, Table 2 presents the proportion of matters declined
by districts during the 1994-2000 time period classified into "thirds"
on percentile rank according to a court size index, which is based
upon the number of matters concluded in the year in question. A
clear relationship emerges whereby the U.S. Attorneys for districts in
the largest third on the court size index declined fewer than one quar-
ter (21%) of the matters referred to them, whereas those for the dis-
tricts in the smallest third declined over one third (37%) of matters.
As predicted, the districts in the middle-sized third fell in between the
two extremes in terms of declination (33%).
145 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUDGET TREND DATA 1975-2003, at 71-72 (2002),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/budgetsummary/btd/1975-2002/2002/pdf/
BudgetTrand.pdf [hereinafter BUDGET TREND DATA] (indicating that U.S. Attorneys'
offices budgets experienced a real percentage growth of nearly 47% during
1993-2003; approximately 21% of that growth occurred between 1994-2000).
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TABLE 2. PROPORTION OF MATTERS DECLINED BY DISTRICT SIZE 1 4 6
Mean Number of Matters
Court Size Proportion Declined Concluded Per Year (approx)
Top Third 21% 1343
Middle Third 33% 414
Bottom Third 37% 219
An inspection of Table 2 suggests that the relationship between
district size and declination is linear; in other words, that it is more or
less uniformly true that as district size increases, the proportion of
matters declined decreases. Indeed, the matter-level Pearson correla-
tion coefficient (r = -. 18, p < .001; n = 744,087) between these two
factors indicates that there is a relatively strong and statistically signifi-
cant linear association between the district size index (i.e., number of
matters handled that year for the district in which the matter arose)
and the propensity to decline cases.
b. Comparison of Budget Allocations
A second, perhaps more direct means to examine the effect of
available resources on declinations is to compare the actual resources
available to the districts. Accordingly, Table 3 presents judicial and
prosecutorial resources for each of the relevant years for which data
were available. The following table summarizes the overall expendi-
tures made by the federal criminal justice system from 1994 through
1999 (the latest date for which data were available),
146 Original tabulations prepared by the author from public use data sets made
available by the Bureau ofJustice Statistics. Bureau ofJustice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, EOUSA Suspects in Matters Concluded, at http://jsrc.urban.org/noframe/dd/
variable.cfm (last visited Sep 21, 2003). There were 744,087 matters with complete
data from 1994-2000 included in the analysis. District courts were assigned to
"thirds" in Table 2 based on percentile rank on number of matters concluded
annually.
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TABLE 3. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT JUSTICE SYSTEM EXPENDITURES IN
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
1 4 7
Year Total Justice System Police Protection Judicial and Legal Corrections
1994 19,084 8059 8184 2841
1995 22,651 9298 9184 4169
1996 23,344 10,115 9459 3766
1997 27,065 12,518 10,651 3896
1998 22,833 12,207 7461 3164
1999 27,392 14,796 8515 4080
As this table shows, a clear trend emerged showing that expendi-
tures increased substantially over the sampled time period. Law en-
forcement expenditures on "police protection" in particular, rose
from about $8 billion in 1994 to $14.7 billion in 1999. Corrections
expenditures also increased substantially, while judicial resources
made few gains. As a consequence, one could reasonably expect that
the increase in police expenditures has had substantial bearing upon
the overall increase in the number of matters referred to prosecutors.
Table 4 contains a more refined look at resources available to law
enforcement by examining personnel. The table reflects the number
of full time federal officers overall, and breaks down the number of
officers available to principal law enforcement components-namely,
the FBI, DEA, INS, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
(ATF) 148
TABLE 4. FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 1993-2000149
Number of Number of
Full-Time Officers Per Customs
Federal 10,000 U.S. Service FBI INS DEA ATF
Year Officers Residents Officers Officers Officers Officers Officers
1993 68,825 2.7 10,120 10,075 9466 2813 1959
1996 74,493 2.8 9749 10,389 12,403 2946 1869
1998 83,143 3.1 10,539 11,285 16,552 3305 1723
2000 88,496 3.1 10,522 11,523 17,654 4161 1967
147 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2001, at 4, available at http://www.albany.edu/source
book/1995/pdf/t12.pdf [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
148 Although the ATF historically has been a component within the Department of
the Treasury, it was incorporated into the Department ofJustice in 2003 as a result of
the Homeland Security Act.
149 Federal law enforcement officers are defined as full-time federal officers with
arrest and firearm authority. See BuREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE,
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 1993, 1994 NCJ 151166, at 1; BUREAU OF
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As Tables 4 and 5 illustrate, federal law enforcement agencies ex-
perienced substantial growth over the period in question. Although
the Customs Service has seen only modest increases, the INS, FBI, and
DEA have seen fairly substantial gains in budget and, in turn, the
number of agents employed. The increases in the INS doubtless re-
flect the concern Congress has had with respect to illegal immigra-
tion. Similarly, increases in the FBI and DEA budgets and personnel
likely stem from efforts to battle violent and drug-related crime.
TABLE 5. FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT BUDGET AUTHORITY BY AGENCY
1994-2000150
Year Customs Service FBI INS DEA ATF
1 5 1
1994 $1458 $2063 $1624 $ 970 $386
1995 $1409 $2280 $2120 $1001 $457
1996 $1502 $2433 $2639 $1050 $429
1997 $1638 $2739 $3256 $1238 $516
1998 $1679 $2932 $3798 $1384 $572
1999 $2100 $2992 $3958 $1477 $584
2000 $1935 $3040 $4305 -$1587 $614
The struggle, of course, comes in matching those who investigate
and refer criminal matters to those who must prosecute and adjudi-
cate the cases. It is at this juncture that the picture becomes some-
what more clouded. Resource increases in the U.S. Attorneys' offices
and in the courts have not quite kept pace with those of federal law
enforcement. Indeed, as the following tables demonstrate, U.S. Attor-
neys' offices have fared slightly less well than the courts in terms of
budgetary increases.
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 1996,
1998 NCJ 164617, at 1; BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 1998, 2000 NCJ 177607, at 1; BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 2000, 2001
NCJ 187231, at 1.
150 In millions of dollars (inflation adjusted).
151 Reflects ATF budget figures contained in BUDGET TREND DATA, supra note 145,
at 131.
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TABLE 6. STAFFING IN U.S. ATrORNEYS' OFFICES 1994-2000152
Year 15 3  Attorneys Support Staff Total Personnel Total Positions
15 4
1994 4064 4620 8684 8239
1995 4365 4476 8841 8302
1996 4530 4553 9083 8595
1997 4449 4536 8985 8652
1998 4674 4686 9360 8948
1999 4888 5454 10,342 9044
2000 4172 4655 8827 9120
One telling point of comparison is the 1996-2000 increase in the
number of federal law enforcement officer positions shown in Table 4
versus the increase over the same time period in the U.S. Attorneys'
offices' positions in Table 6. From 1996 to 2000, the number of fed-
eral law enforcement officers with arrest powers increased by 18%
(from 74,493 to 88,496) while over that same time period, the number
of persons working in U.S. Attorneys' offices increased by only 6%
(from 8595 to 9120). Of even greater significance, the number of
attorneys actually seems to have decreased during the surveyed pe-'
riod. The seemingly anomalous result suggests that despite a fairly
stable number of attorneys (from 4064 attorneys in 1994 to 4172 in
2000), those attorneys were declining fewer matters and filing more
cases in district court. It is difficult to speculate as to why this might
have occurred. One might think that a stable cadre of AUSAs would
mean that more matters would be declined and fewer prosecuted.
The increase in filings and corresponding decrease in declined mat-
ters, however, belies that hypothesis. A possible explanation may lie
in the complexity of the filed cases. It may be the case that AUSAs are
simply pursuing less complex matters in district court, and thus are
able to handle a greater number of cases. If, in fact, AUSAs are inter-
ested in gaining trial experience, it may be possible that they are in-
clined to forgo resource intensive, time-consuming matters in an
effort to maximize time before a judge or jury. This is plainly an area
that merits further serious study.
152 EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATToRNEYs, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, ANNUAL STATISTICAL
REPORTS, 1994-2000 (2002).
153 The 1999 and 2000 figures for attorneys, support staff, and total personnel are
calculated by the author from a data set provided by EOUSA, and are therefore not
fully comparable with figures published in the Annual Statistics Report for fiscal year
2000.
154 Total positions data summarized from BUDGET TREND DATA, supra note 145, at
73.
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In a similar vein, Tables 7 and 8 furnish resource information for
the U.S. district courts over part of the relevant timeframe. Table 7
reveals that full-time equivalent positions in the courts went from a
total of 17,213 in 1997 to 18,500 in 2000, resulting in a 7% increase.
Over the same four-year period the budgetary obligations for the
courts rose from $1.7 billion to about $2.1 billion for an increase of
about 22%. Thus, the budget for the district courts apparently rose at
a greater rate than the number of people employed therein.














As these tables show, the proportional resources available to the
part of the federal justice system, which generates referrals for prose-
cution, continues to outstrip those available for prosecution itself.
Presumably, to the extent that investigatory resources continue to
dwarf the number of attorneys available to try cases, or judges availa-
ble to hear cases, prosecutors will be compelled to select cases based
upon resource considerations. Similarly, ifjudges prove to be the bot-
tleneck, they too will be forced to implement management strategies
for the ever-increasing number of filed cases. Regardless, declinations
remain a driving force within the criminal justice system.
155 Original analysis of data provided to author by the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts (on file with author).
156 Resources in millions of dollars. Data provided to author by the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts (on file with author).
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3. Declinations by the Referring Agency
In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, much has
been made of the professionalism of federal law enforcement agen-
cies. 157 Indeed, the.FBI has often been touted as the single most im-
portant law enforcement agency in the world.'5  The reality, however,
is that even the vaunted FBI, beset by a series of well-publicized public
relations disasters, has seen its image tarnished. 59
Nor are federal law enforcement agencies clones of one another;
they each have different cultures and perhaps inconsistent reputa-
tions and policies for generating referrals. Concern about ensuring
prosecution may lead agents to hold onto matters longer than is nec-
essary, or even beneficial, for the orderly administration of justice. It
is occasionally suggested that law enforcement agencies are often in-
clined to drop a case only after an Assistant U.S. Attorney has had an
opportunity to consider it; as a consequence, agencies sometimes re-
fer inadequately developed legal matters to the U.S. Attorneys' offices
for processing. 160 It is therefore useful to consider declinations in the
context of the referring agency, as that may tend to show the relative
strength of that agency's investigative resources, or the care with
which an agency handles a case prior to referring it to a U.S. Attor-
ney's office. To this end, Table 9 presents the proportion-of all mat-
ters referred to U.S. Attorneys by various law enforcement agencies,
and the declination rates for each.
157 Before the House Comm. of Veterans Affairs, 107th Cong. 107-14 (Oct. 15, 2001)
(statement of Annie W. Everette, Acting Regional Administrator, Nat'l Capital Re-
gion, General Servs. Admin.).
158 Press Release, Senator Charles Schumer, Schumer, Hatch Unveil Bill to Create
Blue Ribbon Commission to Conduct Top-to-Bottom Review of FBI (June 20, 2001).
159 Ken Guggenheim, Congressional Sept. 11 Inquiry Looks at Sharing of Intelligence,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRE, Oct. 1, 2002, WESTLAW, Westnews Library,
APWIRESPLUS.
160 Elizabeth Glazer, Thinking Strategically: How Federal Prosecutors Can Reduce Violent
Crime, 26 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 573, 576-81 (1999).
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TABLE 9. PROPORTION OF MATTERS DECLINED By
REFERRING AGENCY
16 1
Proportion Relative Probability of Proportion of Number of
Referring Agency Declined Declination 16 2 All Matters Matters Referred
IRS 43% Higher 3% 23,497
DEA 19% Lower 15% 111,834
FBI 43% Higher 30% 221,212
INS 4% Lower 11% 81,386
Marshals 43% Higher 2% 14,166
Postal 40% Higher 4% 33,017
ATF 33% Higher 6% 43,642
Customs 16% Lower 7% 49,946
Secret Service 34% Higher 4% 30,280
Other 32% n.s.163  18% 135,107
As might be expected, the FBI Was by far the largest source of
referrals during this time, accounting for some 30% of the total mat-
ters referred. The next largest sources of referrals were the DEA
(15%) and the INS (11%), respectively-both Justice Department
components. Miscellaneous agencies' 64 other than those listed on the
table accounted for 18% of all referrals, while the IRS, U.S. Marshals
Service, Postal Service, Customs, and Secret Service all contributed re-
ferral percentages that failed to break out of the single digits.
161 Original tabulations prepared by the author from public use data sets made
available by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 147. The
analysis included a total of 744,087 matters with complete data from 1994-2000. See
supra note 146.
162 The relative probability of declination for referrals from each agency
computed by calculating the adjusted residual statistic for the parallel cross tabulation
on a 2% random sample of the population of matters. Adjusted residual statistics are
standardized scores with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. To the
extent that the obtained value in the cell is larger or smaller than that expected under
independence, the adjusted residual becomes correspondingly larger or smaller.
Probabilities under independence of very large or small values are as follows: (1) an
absolute value of adjusted residual = 2, p = .045; (2) an absolute value of adjusted residual =
2.5, p = .01. Shelby J. Haberman, Log-Linear Models for Frequency Tables with Ordered
Classifications, 30 BIOMETRICS 589, 592 (1974). In this study, cells with absolute values
for adjusted residual equaling two or greater are reported as significantly different
(i.e., having "higher" or "lower" relative probabilities).
163 No significant difference in relative probability.
164 Over 350 different referring entities appear at least once in the data. These
include state and local authorities, courts, and all manner of federal agencies (e.g.,
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, Forest Service, Department of Education, and
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 147.
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Scrutiny of the results in the column entitled "Relative Probability
of Declination" reveals significant differences in the likelihood that
matters will be declined depending on the agency that referred them
for prosecution. Thus, matters referred by the DEA (19% declined),
Customs Service (16% declined), and INS (4% declined) were rela-
tively unlikely to be declined when compared to matters referred by
other agencies. All other agencies in Table 9 had declination rates in
the 30% to 40% range. This analysis indicates that the matters re-
ferred by the FBI, the U.S. Marshals, the IRS, and Postal authorities
are particularly likely to be declined.
It is possible that the FBI sees a greater percentage of matters
declined because of the sheer volume of matters they refer for prose-
cution, the culture of their close working relationships with prosecu-
tors, or other internal policies.' 65 Nevertheless, these differences
suggest that authorities ought to consider evaluating the agency refer-
ral process and general investigatory policies. If FBI agents, for exam-
ple, are using prosecutors as a "clearing house" to weed out deficient
cases, it may be fruitful to pursue better agent training as a means of
preserving prosecutor time. On the other hand, it may be the case
that a number of referred matters are ultimately absorbed into larger
cases, or-by their sheer volume-make it difficult for prosecutors to
move on each referred matter. Regardless, the high number of FBI-
referred matters that are declined for prosecution is an area worthy of
further study.
The reason for the relatively high proportion of declined matters
from the IRS may relate to the fact that other avenues for pursuing
delinquent taxpayers exist.166 The IRS is not limited to pursuing crim-
inal prosecution in order to obtain just results. It may proceed against
a taxpayer civilly, and may substitute civil fines and restitution sched-
ules in lieu of criminal sanctions. 16 7 Such alternatives are not necessa-
rily available for drug or fraud defendants.
4. Nature of the Offense Alleged
Another general hypothesis about prosecutorial declinations is
that the likelihood that a matter will be declined varies according to
the nature of the offense alleged. 168 In other words, all other things
165 John T. Elliff, National Security and Civil Liberties: The Attorney General's Guidelines
for FBI Investigations, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 785, 786-88 (1984).
166 See 26 U.S.C. § 6651 (2000).
167 Id.
168 See Wayne A. Logan, Comment, A Proposed Check on the Charging Discretion of
Wisconsin Prosecutors, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1695, 1733.
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being held constant, the gravity of the offense is likely to affect the
probability that it will be declined. A less serious offense is thus more
likely to be declined than a more serious offense. This only makes
sense if one accepts the underlying principle that, when resources are
scarce, it is incumbent upon the government to pursue only the most
serious offenses. If resources were not scarce, or it could be demon-
strated that the pursuit of certain less significant crimes increased de-
terrent effects with respect to more serious crimes, then trivial crimes
could be pursued with equal vigor to serious offenses. Such a world
does not exist, however. Prioritization is thus both inevitable and
laudable. Few individuals would fault the Attorney General for en-
couraging prosecutors to forsake minor drug offenses, leaving them
to state authorities, in exchange for an increased effort to ferret out
terrorists. To this end, this Part of the Article will present data on the
relationship between declination and (1) offense priority, (2) type of
offense charged, and (3) the nature of the illegal substance involved
in drug cases.
The offense priority represents the Justice Department's present
view that a particular sort of activity demands a substantial commit-
ment of public resources to combat. 169 A difficulty with this informa-
tion is that priorities presumably shift over time. Similarly, the relative
experience of AUSAs may have an effect as well. A newly minted assis-
tant attorney may view a matter before her quite differently from the
manner a seasoned veteran might view precisely the same matter.
This potential for variation among reviewing attorneys highlights, in
some respects, the importance of established rules to guide attorney
prioritization.
With respect to the "type" of offense charged, the Justice Depart-
ment groups offenses in rough categories relating to "violent of-
fenses," "frauds," "drug offenses," "property offenses," "regulatory,"
and "public order" offenses. 170 Although these categories are necessa-
rily crude, they do speak to providing some sort of rough order for a
relative comparison of offenses-both inter- and intra-offense type (s).
For example, examining declinations by the type of illegal drug in-
volved is a means of assessing law enforcement's prioritization of drug
offenses. If prosecutors deem heroin to be a more serious drug (or
social problem) than marijuana, then presumably more heroin prose-
169 See OFFICE OF THE AT'TORNEY GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, FY 2001 PERFORM-
ANCE REPORT & FY 2002 REVISED FINAL FY 2003 PERFORMANCE PLAN (2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2001/Section01.htm.
170 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROJECT, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INCI-
DENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM, VOLUME I: DATA COLLECTION GUIDELINES (2000),
available at http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/nibrsvlb.pdf.
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cutions will be pursued. Alternatively, if a particular community be-
lieves sophisticated bank frauds to be more serious than simple drug
possession offenses, then such drug offenses ought to be declined at a
greater rate than frauds.
a. Offense Priority Classifications and Declinations
Prioritizing offenses is a useful means of ensuring the efficient
use of otherwise scarce resources. The President, the Attorney Gen-
eral, and Congress presumably establish (or at least generally articu-
late) national priorities, whereas local communities may clamor for
enforcement efforts to concentrate on problems of more immediate,
local concern. If, for example, the nation deems it vital to combat
terrorism offenses, it makes little sense to focus an office's attention
on minor white collar crime matters. Similarly, if methamphetamine
use plagues a particular district, it might mean that resources should
be shifted away from more minor drug prosecutions. Nevertheless,
the designation of what constitutes a "priority" will often come from
the top down. 171
A current example of the Attorney General's setting of such a
priority is contained in the Justice Department's Revised Final FY 2003
Performance Plan.172 The first section of the Performance Plan articu-
lates "Strategic Goal One," which is "To Protect America Against the
Threat of Terrorism." 173 In this section, the Justice Department vows
to "devote all resources necessary to disrupt, weaken, and eliminate
terrorist networks, to prevent or thwart terrorist operations, and to
bring to justice the perpetrators of terrorist acts."1 74 Scrutiny of the
Performance Plan indicates that the intention of this declaration is to
focus the efforts of the various Justice Department components on the
fight against terrorism. To this end, the Performance Plan specifies
antiterrorism activities to be undertaken by the FBI, the INS, the DEA,
and the U.S. Attorneys' offices. 175
171 The U.S. Attorneys' Manual alludes to this process as follows:
[11n the interest of allocating its limited resources so as to achieve an effec-
tive nationwide law enforcement program, from time to time the Depart-
ment establishes national investigative and prosecutorial priorities .... [I]n
addition, individual U. S. Attorneys may establish their own priorities, within
the national priorities, in order to concentrate their resources on problems
of particular local or regional significance.
U.S. ATroRNEYs' MANuAL, supra note 20, § 9-27.230(B) (1).
172 OFFICE OF THE ArroRNEY GENERAL, supra note 169.
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Each of these Justice Department components has specified per-
formance measures that indicate success in fulfilling the antiterrorism
mandate. One such measure is the number of terrorist convictions.1 76
This figure is defined in terms of EOUSA central case management
system data. Specifically, the Justice Department counts terrorist con-
victions as the number of "defendants who plead guilty or were found
guilty in cases classified by the U.S. Attorneys' offices under the Do-
mestic Terrorism program category or the International Terrorism
program category.1 77
Presently, the Justice Department data records matters as being
of either "national" or "district" priority, both, or neither.1 78 Matters
are classified as national priorities if their program category is so des-
ignated. 179 Matters in some program categories are per se designated
as national priorities (e.g., "federal corruption-procurement," "illegal
discharge of toxic waste," and "cases assigned exclusively to the Organ-
ized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force").18° However, matters in
some program categories only become national priorities if the dollar
loss involved is above a particular threshold.1 8 1
Table 10 contains information about the relationship between
the priority classification of matters and declination. Matters classi-
fied as primarily a district priority make up only 13% of the total. Mat-
176 Id. at 17.
177 Id. These criminal program categories are a means by which the Justice De-
partment classifies offenses for data collection purposes. To this end, an Assistant
U.S. Attorney who receives a criminal referral completes a form that contains some
eighty different criminal program categories. See Criminal Matter and Declination
Sheet, supra, note 136. Particular offenses under the U.S. Code are grouped into
program categories on a conceptual basis. Thus, category 011, called "Federal Cor-
ruption-procurement" is defined as "[c]orruption of any federal official or em-
ployee relating to the procurement of goods and services (may involve violations of 18
U.S.C. 201, 203, 371, 872, 1001, 1962 and other statutes)." Transactional Records
Access Clearing House, Syracuse Univ., Program Category Codebook: Program Category, at
http://trac.syr.edu/documents/DDAppendixB.html (last visited Sep. 9, 2003).
178 The Program Category Codebook for the data notes that a matter qualifies as
being a "District Priority" if it is so determined by the local U.S. Attorney and the
district priority is different from the established national priorities. Transactional
Records Access Clearinghouse, Syracuse Univ., Program Category Codebook: Agency Prior-




181 See, e.g., program category 037, "Bankruptcy Fraud," which is defined as
"[f]raud against creditors, concealment of assets, and other illegal acts related to
bankruptcy and bankruptcy proceedings .... may involve violations of 18 U.S.C. 152,
153, 1341, 1343, 1962 and related statues." Id. The codebook notes that "[a]ll such
cases involving $100,000 or more in aggregate losses are national priorities." Id.
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ters that are of only national, only district, or both a district and
national priority comprise the remainder.
TABLE 10. PROPORTION OF MATTERS DECLINED By
OFFENSE PRIORITY
1 8 2
Proportion Relative Probability Proportion of Number of
Priority Classification Declined of Declination All Matters Matters
National and District 27% Lower 9% 62,780
District Only 32% Higher 13% 97,394
National Only 29% Lower 37% 272,138
Neither National Nor
District 31% Higher 41% 294,948
Perhaps expectedly, matters that are neither a national nor a local
priority comprise the bulk (41%) of the declinations. In contrast,
matters that are both a national and district priority account for the
smallest (but still significant) proportion of declined matters at 9% of
the total.
The relative probability analysis for these data revealed that mat-
ters classified as district only or as neither a national nor a district
priority were relatively likely to be declined. This suggests that the ar-
ticulation of a matter as a national or a local priority makes a differ-
ence as to whether a matter will be pursued. Looks can be deceiving,
however. An inspection of the actual percentages involved showed
that, while significant, these differences were not large in the absolute
sense. Thus, the "District Only" (32% declined) and "Neither Na-
tional Nor District" classifications (31% declined) percentages were
not strikingly larger than the "National and District" (27% declined)
and "National Only" (29% declined) classifications. Nevertheless, the
pattern suggested by this analysis is that prosecutors are generally
more likely to decline matters in which a national priority is not in-
volved than other matters.
This information is certainly heartening to the extent that it con-
firms the view that the establishment of national (and district) priori-
ties should have an effect upon behavior in the field. Nevertheless, it
remains clear that substantial resources are still devoted to prosecu-
tions in which only a parochial, or no, interest is involved. Insofar as
officials clearly articulate and publicize national and district priorities,
it may be the case that greater effort will be made to carry out those
priorities. It will be of considerable value to determine whether Attor-
182 The total number of matters with valid data was 727,260. For information on
the data source, and the method used for the relative probability analysis, see supra
notes 145-47.
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ney General Ashcroft's call to make domestic security and combating
terrorism the Justice Department's chief objectives will be realized.
b. Offense Classifications and Declinations
The grouping of offenses by "class" is a complicated endeavor.
Federal law sets forth hundreds of statutes under which defendants
can be criminally prosecuted. Numerous federal agencies collect stat-
ute-specific offense data and, for the convenience of reporting, con-
solidate various criminal statutes into particular offense categories.1 8 3
Unfortunately (at least for research purposes), while each agency con-
solidates the offense specific statutes using the same generic criteria
(e.g., murder, fraud, drugs), the actual composition of these catego-,
ries tends to vary significandy by agency.1 84 Moreover, unlike offense
categories reported by the federal judiciary, the United States Sen-
tencing Commission (USSC), and the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), those
reported by the U.S. Attorneys are not based entirely on statutes. 185
For example, the U.S. Attorneys assign program categories and
charges according to the type of criminal action or specific depart-
mental initiative. 186 For some offenses, particularly fraud offenses,
U.S. Attorneys' program categories are more descriptive than the of-
fense categories used by other agencies. 187 An offense charged under
a specific fraud statute might be assigned a program category by U.S.
Attorneys that details a specific type of fraud (e.g., health care fraud),
or an offense charged under a weapons statute might be assigned a
program category that denotes a repeat weapons offender. 188
The U.S. Attorneys assign the most significant, or most serious,
offense in a manner that also differs from the federal judiciary, the
USSC, and the BOP. The U.S. Attorneys assign the most significant
offense based on the priority of a particular program category within
the Department ofJustice, whereas the other agencies define the most
183 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS, available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm (the Uniform Crime Reporting
Program collects, publishes, and archives various crime statistics, including the com-
prehensive "Crime in the United States"); see also CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, supra
note 141, at 18-19.
184 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 183.
185 U.S. SENTENCING COMM., AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
(2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/training/fsgovr03.pdf.
186 See U.S. ATTOR'NES' MANUAL, supra note 20, §§ 9-8.000 to -110.000.
187 Id. at §§ 940.000 to - 49.000.
188 Id.
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significant offense based on the offense statutory maximum or, in the
case of the BOP, on the actual sentence imposed.1 89
In recognizing the incomparability of case processing statistics
across federal agencies, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) imple-
mented the Federal Justice Statistics Program, which attempts to pro-
vide uniform case processing statistics across the different stages of the
federal criminal justice system. Although the data come from numer-
ous federal agencies, BJS applies uniform definitions to commonly
used statistics describing data from each stage of the criminal justice
process. BJS uses six main categories to record offenses. 90 These
groupings, which are adopted here, are an effort to reconcile the dif-
fering means of reporting across the federal government. Table 11
thus presents declination data for alleged offenses classified according
to BJS definitions.
TABLE 11. PROPORTION OF MATTERS DECLINED By SIx-WAY BJS
OFFENSE CLASSIFICATION
19 1
Proportion Relative Probability Proportion of Number of
Offense Type Declined of Declination All Matters Matters
Violent 34% Higher 6% 42,331
Fraud 44% Higher 25% 185,618
Other Property 38% Higher 4% 26,348
Drug 20% Lower 32% 233,079
Regulatory Pub. Order 64% Higher 5% 36,881
Other Pub. Order 22% Lower 29% 211,661
The relative probability analysis for the data contained in Table
11 revealed that drug offenses (20% declined) and other public order
offenses (22% declined) 192 were infrequently declined compared to
189 Id. at § 9-27.300.
190 These are: (1) Violent offenses such as murder, robbery and kidnapping; (2)
Fraudulent property offenses such as embezzlement, fraud and counterfeiting; (3)
Other property offenses such as larceny and auto theft; (4) Drug offenses; (5) Regula-
tory public order offenses such as food and drug and civil rights offenses; and (6)
Other public order offenses such as immigration, weapons, and tax law violations.
The Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics contains more detail on these catego-
ries. See CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 141, at 19.
191 The total number of matters with valid data was 735,918. For information on
the data source, and method used for the relative probability analysis, see supra notes
145-47.
192 It is worthwhile pointing out that immigration violations comprise approxi-
mately 60% of the matters in the "other public order" category. See supra notes
145-47. With increased attention paid to immigration offenses, the category may be
dramatically affected over time.
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the other offense categories in the table. Despite their somewhat am-
biguous label, "Other Public Order" offenses are not insignificant. In-
cluded within this offense category are crimes involving weapons,
immigration offenses, and violations of the tax law. 193 Prosecutors
have increasingly targeted crimes involving weapons and immigration
offenses for prosecution. 194 With a renewed emphasis on identifying
immigration violations as a means of combating terrorism, it is un-
likely that prosecutors' focus on immigration offenses will be blurred.
c. Declinations by Drug Type
The nature of the particular type of drug involved in the offense
is also a useful indicator of whether a declination may occur. Differ-
ent drugs, certainly, have differing effects both upon the individual
and upon the community in which they are distributed. 19 5 Most peo-
ple, laymen and professionals alike, would doubtlessly consider mari-
juana to be a less harmful drug'9 6 (in terms of either its deleterious
effect upon the community or its harmfulness to the drug-abusing in-
dividual) than heroin or cocaine. It is not that marijuana is not
deemed harmful, in and of itself; it is merely that a notorious street
drug like heroin is popularly considered more harmful than mari-
juana.1 97 If that assumption is, in fact, correct, one would expect that
law enforcement would be more diligent in its pursuit of heroin of-
fenders than marijuana offenders. Presumably, law enforcement is
most concerned with removing the more dangerous drugs from distri-
bution channels.
193 CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 141, at 19, 28-29.
194 See Joe Cantlupe, Justice Report: Immigration Prosecutions Double Between 1996 and
2000, COPLEY NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 6, 2002; see also Kris Wise, Prosecutor's Office Getting
Help for Gun Related Cases; Federal Agency Gives Out Grants to County Office, CHARLESTON
DAILY MAIL, May 1, 2002, at IC; OFFICE OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, STRATEGIC PLAN 2001-2006, at 24-29, 74-85 (2001), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/strategic200l-2006/entiredoc.htm.
195 Peter Reuter, Setting Priorities: Budget and Program Choices for Drug Control, 1994
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 145, 165-66 (1994); see alsoJoe Dombrowski, First Step in Drug Preven-
tion is to Grasp the Problem, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 16, 2003, at E6; Robert
MacCoun & Peter Reuter, Marijuana, Heroin, and Cocaine; The War on Drugs May Be a
Disaster, But Do We Really Want a Legalized Peace?, AMERICAN PROSPECT, June 3, 2002, at
25.
196 COMMUNITy ANTI-DRUG COALITIONS OF AMERICA & THE OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG
CONTROL POLICY, MARIJUANA-DEBUNKING THE MYTHS (2003), available at http://
www.mediacampaign.org/marijuana/Strategizer.pdf.
197 See id.; Drug Policy Information Clearinghouse, Office of Nat'l Drug Control
Policy, Drug Facts: Marijuana (June 2003), at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
drugfact/marijuana/index.htmi (last modified Sept. 11, 2003).
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If this hypothesis is correct, it might be inferred that matters in
which marijuana was the drug of choice would be declined at a higher
rate than cocaine. The actual picture that emerges when declinations
are analyzed, however, is murky. Table 12 contains an analysis con-
ducted on the roughly one quarter of matters that are drug offenses.
It presents the proportion of matters declined by type of drug
involved.19s
TABLE 12. PROPORTION OF MATTERS DECLINED By TYPE OF
DRUG INVOLVED' 9 9
Proportion Relative Probability Proportion Of
Drug Declined Of Declination All Matters
Amphetamine 26% n.s. 1%
Cocaine 20% Higher 33%
Heroin 12% n.s. 7%
Crack 15% n.s. 16%
Marijuana 12% Lower 31%
Methamphetamine 16% n.s. 12%
The relative probability analysis revealed the rather surprising "
finding that marijuana is "tied" with heroin for the least likely type of
drug offense to be declined, with a declination rate of 12%. Thus, a
matter involving marijuana is less likely to be declined than one in-
volving amphetamines, methamphetamines, or powder and crack co-
caine. About one third of the reported matters involved powder
cocaine, and another 16% involved the crack form of the drug. Mari-
juana accounted for 31% of the matters with the remainder involving
methamphetamine, heroin, and amphetamine.
Several possible explanations might be offered to resolve this
seeming anomaly. The declination rates might reflect the fact that
the only marijuana matters referred to the U.S. Attorneys' offices in-
volved fairly large amounts of the drug, or that there are a higher
number of defendants prosecuted who are traffickers as opposed to
mere possessors. 200 It is also possible that prosecutors elect to drop
more serious drug charges and retain charges involving marijuana as a
means of (successfully) inducing defendants to plea. Plainly, further
198 Note that these were selected drug types; table does not include 6% of matters
that involved other drugs such as barbiturates, steroids, etc.
199 The total number of matters with valid data was 177,044. For information on
the data source, and the method used for the relative probability analysis for this
table, see supra notes 145-47.
200 U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., Drug Trafficking in the United States, at http://
www.dea.gov/concern/drug-traficking.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
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study is necessary to determine why matters involving marijuana ap-
pear less likely to be declined than matters involving more dangerous
drugs.
Regardless, these explanations almost certainly cannot hold true
for explaining the relatively low declination rate for offenses involving
crack cocaine. Crack cocaine, which is derived from the powder, is
typically sold in small vials or baggies; it is not itself the subject of
importation, nor is it even the preferred means of large quantity dis-
tribution. 20 ' It is routinely found as a street-level drug. The relatively
low percentage of crack cocaine matters declined by prosecutors may
be due to the fact that much of society perceives crack to be more
harmful than marijuana, or that crack penalties are, to an extent,
higher than those of powder, 20 2 and thus crack cases present a more
alluring target for prosecutors. If those are in fact the most coherent
explanations for understanding these results, it would be useful for
policymakers and Justice Department officials to implement guide-
lines with respect to drug prosecutions. Higher penalties for more
harmful drugs will likely affect prosecutors' decisions as to which mat-
ters they should vigorously pursue. Whether appropriate or not, pen-
alties will affect prosecutorial decisionmaking-even if merely as a
signal to gauge harm.
III. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study has examined declination trends and explored re-
source and priority indicators that appear to influence those trends.
Although a clear pattern has emerged-namely, that during the years
examined (1994-2000), a lower percentage of matters were declined
each year-it remains a fact that federal prosecutors decline roughly a
quarter of all criminal matters referred to them. The data suggest
that, as Congress increased resources allocated to prosecutors and in-
vestigators over time, the proportion of matters declined decreased.
As might have been expected, expanded resources yielded a more vig-
orous pursuit of criminal activity. As federal investigative agency refer-
rals to the U.S. Attorneys' offices increased during the relevant time
period, the actual number of matters declined varied over time, with a
201 Drug Policy Information Clearinghouse, Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy,
Drug Facts: Crack, at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/drugfact/crack b.html
(last modified Sep 11, 2003). See generally U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, DEA, at http://www.dea.gov (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
202 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL COCAINE OFFENSES: AN ANALYSIS OF CRACK AND
POWDER PENALTIES 21 (Mar. 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/
cocaine.pdf.
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slight decrease in the total number of matters declined during the
relevant time period. It is inevitable that with a substantial number of
matters being declined each year, prosecutorial selectivity will remain
an inevitable feature of the criminal justice system.
Provided that such selectivity is accomplished in a rational man-
ner, however, it is not necessarily problematic. The difficulty is in en-
suring that federal prosecutorial resources are deployed in an
efficient fashion. Efficiency, of course, may mean a variety of things
depending upon who is defining it.203 Significant policy questions
must be answered in determining whether pursuing a specific sort of
"efficiency" is appropriate. One might argue, for example, that it is
inefficient for the federal government to squander valuable national
resources pursuing crimes that also fall within the ambit of state juris-
diction.20 4 In the alternative, it might be asserted that if a community
is having a particular sort of crime problem-like a flood of gang-
related activity-it is entirely proper for federal prosecutors to lend a
hand to bring such individuals to justice. However, such assistance
comes at a cost-namely in terms of distracting federal prosecutors
from pursuing cases of national importance, or cases that are exclu-
sively within the jurisdiction of the federal government.
A further obstacle to the efficient use of federal resources is that
the deployment of federal resources can sometimes seem haphazard.
In comparing declination rates across offenses, drug offenses plainly
constitute the least likely matters prosecutors decline-even though
state and local authorities may also pursue such matters. 20 5 On the
other hand, matters involving the commission of violent or fraudulent
acts tend to be declined with somewhat greater frequency. 20 6 At first
blush, it would thus appear that federal resources are being spent
chiefly upon crimes involving the use or trafficking of illegal drugs.
Unpacking the reasons as to why this may be the case, however, is
difficult. It may be that matters labeled as "violent" are little more
than routine simple assaults on federal property, or that some fraud
cases involve too small a dollar amount to be worth a federal prosecu-
203 See William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The
Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L. J.
1325, 1364-67 (1993) (explaining the political and practical reasons why prosecutors
prefer to keep prosecution policies unpublished and flexible).
204 See Litman & Greenberg, supra note 79, at 75-77.
205 Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Duel Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law Enforce-
ment and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1165-68 (1995).
206 See supra Tables 5 and 6.
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tor's attention. 20 7 Regardless, the trends certainly illustrate the em-
phasis that the federal government has placed upon fighting drug-
related offenses. A more important question to ask is whether the
type of drug cases being pursued are merely duplicative of state ef-
forts, or are crimes of particular interest to federal authorities and
resonating with national priorities.
As Attorney General Ashcroft has noted, prosecutorial priorities
matter.2 0 8  Although redirecting the Justice Department's
prosecutorial and investigative efforts may be akin to steering the Ti-
tanic, the prioritization of crimes to pursue does have an impact. In
particular, federal efforts ought to be directed to those crimes which
have a national bent or fall expressly within unique federal jurisdic-
tion. What seems odd, however, is that 27% of those matters labeled
as being both a "national" and a "district" priority are being de-
clined.20 9 While that is low compared to non-priority matters-31%
of which are not being pursued-it is still surprisingly high, especially
in light of the fact that 69% of matters classified as non-priority are
being prosecuted. 2 10 Of course, there may be other reasons not easily
discernable from the raw data as to why prosecutors have declined
such seemingly important cases. If the Attorney General's words are
to be heeded, then it would seem that not only is a re-ordering of
priorities needed, but prosecutors must also pursue those cases deter-
mined to be of national significance. Despite the limitations of cen-
tralized control of Main Justice over the individual U.S. Attorneys'
offices, the Department can still influence office priorities through
both formal and informal means. 211
These findings, while tentative, raise a number of important pol-
icy issues, particularly in light of the Attorney General's declaration
that prosecutorial efforts would need to be refocused on matters of
serious national concern. A comprehensive analysis of each of these
207 Delbert S. Elliott, Criminal Justice and Other Programs: Life-Threatening Violence is
Primarily a Crime Problem: A Focus on Prevention, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 1081, 1082 (1998).
208 Press Release, John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General, Remarks at AUC Indict-
ment Press Conference (September 24, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/g/
inl/rls/rm/2002/13663.htm (explaining that the indictment of three high-ranking
AUC members was the culmination of a two and a half year investigation, and that the
indictment marked "the convergence of two of the top priorities of the Department of
Justice: the prevention of terrorism, and the reduction of illegal drug use").
209 See supra Table 10.
210 Id.
211 See H.W. Perry, Jr., United States Attorneys-Whom Shall They Serve?, 61 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1998, at 129, 138-40 (describing that at the same time that
budgets for law enforcement agencies, including prosecutors' offices, were increased,
budgets for public defenders were slashed).
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issues is well beyond the scope of this Article. Similarly, the data in
this study cannot conclusively answer the important empirical ques-
tions that underlie these policy issues. Additional research is needed
to obtain a better understanding of prosecutorial discretion, to ex-
plain what criteria prosecutors use in declining to pursue certain types
of cases. That having been said, .what follows is a brief discussion of
several of the significant policy issues raised by this work.
A. Selecting Matters to Prosecute
The surveyed data suggest that the number of detected federal
crimes available to be prosecuted will outstrip existing prosecutorial
resources, if for no other reason than that there are substantially more
individuals investigating crime than actually prosecuting it.212 Re-
source considerations thus inevitably affect the selection of criminal
matters to pursue. As this Article demonstrates, an increase in the
amount of resources available to federal prosecutors and investigative
agencies, as well as to the judicial branch, corresponded with a pro-
portionate decrease in the percentage of matters declined. Although
the actual number of matters declined has varied over this same time
period, the trend has also been downward. Regardless, prosecutors
will not choose to pursue all alleged criminal matters referred to
them. Given scarce resources (an inevitability), prosecutors will al-
ways be faced with having to choose which crimes, and which individu-
als, to prosecute. The selection of certain crimes to pursiue necessarily
entails the vindication of particular governmental interests.
The declination trends examined in this study suggest that some
federal offenses might be under-enforced, while others might be over-
enforced. 213 It is unclear whether existing, and certainly limited,
prosecutorial resources are being allocated so as to maximize criminal
enforcement mechanisms. In the absence of such data, however, it
should not be assumed that current levels of enforcement are either
too low, or that expanded resources would lead to uniformly higher
prosecution rates. The important question to be addressed is whether
the proper matters are being pursued and whether those matters
which are not pursued, are declined on the bhsis of appropriate pub-
212 Cf Kim Taylor-Thompson, Effective Assistance: Reconceiving the Role of the Chief
Public Defender, 2J. INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHICS 199, 201-03 (1999) (explaining the sig-
nificant increase in prosecutorial resources in contrast with the funding for defend-
ers' offices).
213 See Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal
Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1295, 1332-33 (2001) (discussing the social costs of crimi-
nal prosecution).
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lic policy considerations. It is in this decision of which cases to pursue
we will now briefly turn.
In deciding which crimes to prosecute, it is important to under-
stand why criminal sanctions-as opposed to, for example, civil penal-
ties-have been selected as a means to enforce certain policy
preferences. In understanding the purposes for imposing criminal
sanctions, then, we can form a better idea of what crimes (and
criminals) ought to be pursued. Federal law, of course, is the creation
of Congress. Therefore, we will turn to statutory mandates in divining
a source of direction to federal prosecutors.
Congress, which considers both retributive and utilitarian ends in
enacting punishment schemes, has in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 articulated the
factors to be considered in imposing a sentence. Pursuant to that stat-
ute, Congress has provided that the sentence "must reflect the serious-
ness of the offense .... promote respect for the law, and.., provide
just punishment for the offense." 214 Similarly, in the utilitarian vein,
the prosecution must "afford adequate deterrence to criminal con-
duct; protect the public from further crimes of the defendant and
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational train-
ing, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effec-
tive manner. ' 215 These goals of sentencing are thus a useful place for
prosecutors to start when selecting matters to pursue. Matters that
seem to fall outside of those goals ought not to be pursued quite as
vigorously.
In the criminal law, the imposition of punishment is generally
predicated upon one of two theoretical bases: the need for retribution
or the desire to obtain some utilitarian end.2 16 Those scholars who
believe that punishment is imposed to achieve retribution (and not
simply limited by retributive or other normative principles) might con-
sider current federal prosecution rates inadequate. 217 After all, nearly
a quarter of alleged federal offenders appear to escape prosecution in
federal court. Although various reasons exist for prosecutors to de-
cline to pursue those matters, it is nevertheless the case that a substan-
tial number of referred matters are left fallow. A retributivist would
thus decry the federal government's inability to bring all detected fed-
eral offenders to justice. If one believes that punishment is imposed to
achieve retribution (and not simply limited by retributive or other nor-
214 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (A) (2000).
215 Id. § 3553(a) (2) (B)-(D).
216 See Ronald J. Rychlak, Society's Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the
Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TuL. L. REv. 299, 300 (1990).
217 See Paul Butler, Retribution, for Liberals, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1873, 1890-92 (1998).
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mative principles), then current federal prosecution rates must be
considered inadequate. Although the trend in having a smaller per-
centage of matters declined might be viewed as a positive sign, the
increased number of declined prosecutions is doubtlessly problem-
atic. The empirical data suggest that significant numbers of federal
offenders escape retribution in federal court.218
If, however, one possesses a strict utilitarian approach to crime
control, such concerns permit a good deal of selectivity in prosecu-
tion. Specific deterrence of the individual offender, which has inca-
pacitation at its heart, is a vital part of the criminal justice system. For
the utilitarian, however, incapacitation, which is quite costly in real
terms, ought to be limited to those instances in which we (1) can pre-
dict a defendant's likely future criminality, and (2) can be assured
that incarceration will prevent (or at least postpone) future crimes-
either by the defendant (specific deterrence) or others (general de-
terrence). From a purely incapacitative perspective, defendants who
do not meet these criteria need not be either prosecuted or punished.
General deterrence, which is designed to discourage others from
committing the same offenses as the present defendant, is an impor-
tant utilitarian aim. Indeed, for utilitarian theorists, general deter-
rence might be the most important aim of the criminal justice
system. 219 To achieve some quantum of general deterrence, prosecu-
tors need not pursue each incidence of criminality. Rather, prosecu-
tors may be able to obtain general deterrence either by focusing on
high-profile defendants (such as Enron or WorldCom executives) or
by selectively targeting those offenders who are most likely to be risk
averse. 220 After all, an occasional prosecution serves to remind the
public that certain behaviors are deemed improper or morally wrong.
Consequently, a single high-profile prosecution (like that of Martha
Stewart) may place other potential offenders on notice that the gov-
ernment intends to ferret them out. Similarly, for certain calculating
offenders-tax law violators come to mind-a relatively low level of
detection and enforcement may nevertheless provide substantial de-
218 Galacatos, supra note 88, at 600-03 (explaining the reasons why a large num-
ber of federal environmental law violators have been able to escape retribution).
219 Kent Greenawalt, Commentary: Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343,
350-52 (1983).
220 Bill Berkot, Day of Reckoning for Corporate "Bad Guys, " REUTERS, Oct. 2, 2002,
available at http://www.forbes.com/markets/newswire/2002/10/02/rtr739545.html
(describing government actions against high profile executives such as Andrew Fas-
tow, former CFO of Enron, and Martha Stewart).
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terrence if the penalty is sufficiently harsh (either in terms of prison
time or of financial penalties) .221
Prosecutors may also choose to focus on those offenders who are
most likely to respond to rehabilitation. Offender rehabilitation,
which is a congressionally mandated objective, 222 is predicated upon a
belief that the defendant may recidivate, and that intervention strate-
gies may prevent that individual from re-offending. 223 Drawing from
the wealth of social science data that is available, prosecutors may
choose to target those individuals most likely to respond to treatment
alternatives. Such a determination, however, is no easy undertaking.
B. Policy Considerations
Once the appropriate theoretical justification for commencing a
prosecution is ascertained, practical and constitutional considerations
that demand consideration remain. Selecting which crimes to pro-
ceed against may be a daunting task. If the Attorney General's deci-
sion to commit greater resources to the pursuit of terrorism is to be
realized, however, care must be given to formulating declination rules
that will enable prosecutors best to refocus their efforts.
1. Establishing Law Enforcement Priorities in a Federated Nation
A unique aspect of American government is the existence of dual
sovereignty-the idea that the state and national governments are
each sovereign in their own particular spheres of action. A corollary
to this idea of dual sovereignty is that even though one sovereign has
the power to remedy a particular problem, it may not have the author-
ity to do so if it would mean trenching upon the other sovereign's
sphere of authority. In other words, just because the federal govern-
ment could prosecute a particular instance of criminal activity does not
mean that it should.224 Limited resources at both the state and na-
tional level suggest that law enforcement authorities should establish
specific priorities and utilize institutional advantages. This is precisely
what appears to be occurring in the prosecution of the recent Wash-
ington, D.C. area sniper case. 225 Although several jurisdictions were
221 Liezl Walker, The Deterrent Value of Imposing Prison Sentences for Tax Crimes, 26
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Crv. CONFINEMENT 1, 4-6 (2000).
222 18 U.S.C. § 4352 (2000).
223 Ernest Van Den Haag, Could Successful Rehabilitation Reduce the Crime Rate?, 73 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1022, 1023-24 (1982).
224 Litman & Greenburg, supra note 79, at 75-77.
225 Morning Edition Profile: Officials Vie to Be the First to Prosecute the Accused Suspects in
the Washington, D.C., Sniper Murders (National Public Radio radio broadcast, Oct. 28,
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affected by the sniper shootings, and each could lay claim to having
an interest in prosecuting offenses perpetrated by the snipers, infor-
mal mechanisms seemed to be at work in allocating the order of pros-
ecution. 226 Most recently, in fact, the federal government, which had
initially filed federal charges in the case, dropped its charges in defer-
ence to what is perceived to be the superior interests of the state gov-
ernments involved. 227 In fact, murder prosecutions of this sort have
traditionally been viewed as being part of the general "police powers"
of state governments.
Differentiating between national and district priorities, however,
is no easy task. The sniper case is a good example. In such a high
profile case that commanded public attention, was it realistic for fed-
eral prosecutors to ignore local concerns? Local needs will also divert
AUSAs' attention from federal priorities, particularly if the Justice De-
partment articulates those priorities in only the vaguest of terms (e.g.,
"the war on drugs"). At present, AUSAs are able to indicate on the
form provided by the Justice Department whether a matter they are
processing represents a crime that is a national priority, a local prior-
ity, or neither. Determining priorities is important not only for the
conservation of resources, but also as a means of selecting the appro-
priate sovereign to prosecute a matter. As an institutional reality, fed-
eral and state prosecutorial offices have differing functions within the
community. Traditionally, elected state district attorneys have been
obligated to be sensitive to community needs and local criminal jus-
tice objectives. State and local prosecutors, who handle the bulk of
the nation's criminal prosecutions, are responsible for enforcing sub-
stantive state criminal laws, which may differ in substance and penalty,
from state to state. Federal prosecutors, appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate, are obligated to focus on national pri-
orities and on criminal matters that may span many local jurisdictions.
Federal prosecutors thus have a special obligation to ensure that fed-
eral law is uniformly enforced throughout the nation, without special
regard for local sensibilities. 228
2002), available at 2002 WL 3190000; The Saturday Early Show Newscast: Maryland, Ala-
bama, Virginia, and the Federal Government Vying for Control of the Prosecution of the Wash-
ington-Area Snipers (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 26, 2002), available at 2002 WL
8118244.
226 Morning Edition Profile, supra note 225.
227 Editorial, Shoppingfor Death, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 13, 2002, at B6. As
of this writing, it remains to be seen whether the federal government will reinstate its
charges.
228 Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define Proper Limits
for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 994-95 (1995). For example, as
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That obligation is perhaps less pronounced today than in the
past.2 29 Congressional expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction has
created considerable overlap between state and federal criminal law
enforcement authority. Historically, the general police power in the
United States has been considered a responsibility of state and local
governments because the Constitution fails to enumerate it as a power
expressly granted to the federal government. 21 The federal govern-
ment's authority to prosecute criminal cases is derived from the "nec-
essary and proper" clause, which grants the government the authority
to execute its enumerated powers. Authority to prosecute also exists in
those areas in which the federal government enjoys exclusive jurisdic-
tion. 231 The police power, per se, is presumed to be reserved to the
states by virtue of the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to the states
all those powers not expressly delegated to the federal government.232
Over the years, however, as Congress has enacted more federal
criminal laws, the amount of overlap between state and federal crimi-
nal jurisdiction has increased. 233  The overlapping of jurisdiction
makes it vital that state and federal efforts are not duplicative, but
instead complement one another. In this way, distilling a rule for dec-
linations would be on the basis of carefully articulated national priori-
ties, which, for efficiencies' sake, would largely include crimes with no
direct state analogue.2 34 Unfortunately, even if not unsurprisingly,
states have individually chosen to decriminalize the use of certain drugs, the Attorney
General has made it clear that federal prosecutors have different obligations than
their state counterparts and must enforce federal law without regard for state drug de-
criminalization efforts.
229 Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 644-46
(2002).
230 U.S. CONST. amend X.
231 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324-25 (1819).
232 U.S. CONST. amend. X (stating that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.").
233 M. Todd Scott, Kidnapping Federalism: United States v. Wills and the Constitution-
ality of Extending Federal Criminal Law Into the States, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 753,
771 (2003); see alsoJones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 860 (2000) (Stevens, J., con-
curring) (stating that the Court "should interpret narrowly federal criminal laws that
overlap with state authority unless Congressional intention to assert its jurisdiction is
plain"); TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, RE-
PORT ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAw 33 (1998).
234 Podgor, supra note 5, at 151 6-20. Examples of such crimes include: federal
criminal tax matters, immigration violations, customs violations, various crimes re-
lated to the administration of justice in federal court (e.g., perjury, contempt), brib-
ery of federal officials, counterfeiting, violations of federal administrative or
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federal prosecutors do not consistently afford offenses without state
equivalents the highest priority.
Narcotics violations, the bulk of which state and federal prosecu-
tors alike pursue, appear to be given more attention that most other
exclusively federal crimes. Only twenty percent of drug matters are
declined by federal prosecutors.2 35 One method of preserving scarce
federal resources would be to carefully review narcotics prosecutions
to ensure that only those of sufficient gravity, or those touching a sig-
nificant national interest, are pursued. Less serious drug cases could
be left to state prosecutors to pursue. Fostering cooperation between
federal and state prosecutors, as well as investigative agencies, may
yield other benefits as well. Redirecting prosecutorial resources to en-
sure that federal authorities are not merely duplicating the efforts of
their state counterparts would free law enforcement officials and pros-
ecutors to target and investigate more serious offenses.
Although the Justice Department's so-called Petite Policy 2 36 is an
effort to delineate crimes that federal prosecutors will pursue vis-A-vis
state prosecutors, in truth, it is often difficult to establish a workable
distinction. Oftentimes, local concerns will drive prosecutorial selec-
tivity. If a particular community is plagued by gun violence, for exam-
ple, federal prosecutors may find themselves inevitably lured into
handling such cases. While this is not necessarily problematic, care
must be taken to ensure than national priorities are not given short
shrift or that U.S Attorneys' offices do not simply devolve into ersatz
district attorneys' offices.
This concern is hardly new. In 1948, as federal criminal jurisdic-
tion first began to expand in the aftermath of World War II, Professor
Louis Schwartz proposed the following criteria to guide the assertion
of such incidental federal criminal jurisdiction:
[I]n general it can be said that federal action is justified in the pres-
ence of one or more of the following circumstances: (1) When the
states are unable or unwilling to act; (2) when the jurisdictional fea-
ture, e.g., use of the mails, is not merely incidental or accidental to
the offense, but an important ingredient of its success; (3) when,
although the particular jurisdictional feature is incidental, an-
other substantial federal interest is protected by the assertion of
federal power; (4) when the criminal operation extends into a num-
regulatory laws, and crimes committed within federal enclaves with exclusive federal
jurisdiction.
235 This percentage is somewhat difficult to calculate due to the relatively impre-
cise BJS offense categorizations used. For information on the data source, see supra
notes 145-47.
236 See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
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ber of states, transcending the local interest of any one; (5) when it
would be inefficient administration to refer to state authorities a
complicated case investigated and developed on the theory of fed-
eral prosecution.
23 7
These criteria represent a useful guide in determining when fed-
eral prosecutorial power ought to be exercised. Professor Schwartz's
criteria assume that state prosecutions might be favored in each of
these instances, but that federal prosecution may be necessary in light
of a substantial federal interest that is best protected by asserting fed-
eral power.
238
Professor Schwartz's proposed guidelines took on greater ur-
gency when, in 1970, with Schwartz acting as its director, the Brown
Commission recommended to Congress that a somewhat different
version of these standards be incorporated in the proposed revision of
the federal criminal code:
Notwithstanding the existence of concurrent jurisdiction, federal
law enforcement agencies are authorized to decline or discontinue
federal enforcement efforts whenever the offense can effectively be
prosecuted by nonfederal agencies and it appears that there is .no
substantial Federal interest in further prosecution or that the of-
fense primarily affects state, local or foreign interests. A substantial
federal interest exists in the following circumstances, among others:
(a) the offense is serious and state or local law enforcement is im-
peded by interstate aspects of the case; (b) federal enforcement is
believed to be necessary to vindicate federally-protected civil rights;
(c) if federal jurisdiction exists under section 201 (b) [pendent ju-
risdiction], the offense is closely related to the underlying offense,
as to which there is a substantial federal interest; (d) an offense
apparently limited in its impact is believed to be associated with or-
ganized criminal activities extending beyond state lines; (e) state or
local law enforcement has been so corrupted as to undermine its
effectiveness substantially. 23
9
The Commission recognized that if left unchecked, federal
prosecutorial authority might simply duplicate state authority, thereby
wasting scare federal resources. As a result, the Brown Commission
sought to provide at least -some guidance as to which cases merited
federal prosecution.
237 Schwartz, supra note 6, at 73.
238 Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029,
1058-61 (1994).
239 NAT'L COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT: A
PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE §207 (1971) [hereinafter NAT'L
COMMISSION].
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The Commission guidelines represent just how much had
changed in the years between Professor Schwartz's original proposal
and the Commission's report. The Commission's report permits fed-
eral prosecution of any case (where jurisdiction otherwise obtains)
and only restricts declinations.2 40 By contrast, the original Schwartz
version appears to start with the premise that state jurisdiction is pri-
mary, and that federal jurisdiction is appropriate only if certain pre-
conditions are met.241 The two versions agree that each of the
following factors support federal jurisdiction: (1) the offense cannot
be effectively prosecuted by local authorities; (2) there is a "substan-
tial federal interest" in the prosecution; or (3) the offense involves
several states, and transcends local interests. 242 In an attempt to pro-
vide some sort of definition for the otherwise ambiguous term "sub-
stantial federal interest," the Commission provided additional
guidance by listing examples of circumstances that create such an in-
terest (e.g., organized criminal activities extending beyond state
lines) .243
Nearly thirty years later, still guided by the spirit of Professor
Schwartz's original article, if not its letter, the American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA), under the leadership of former Attorney General Edwin
Meese, issued its report, The Federalization of Criminal Law (ABA Re-
port).244 The ABA Report criticized the broad expansion of federal
criminal jurisdiction, and urged Congress to abate its appetite to fed-
eralize crimes having only the slimmest connections to articulated na-
tional interests. 245 Although the report did not itself promulgate
guidelines for prosecutors to adopt, it did articulate three principle
bases upon which Congress might choose legitimately to criminalize
conduct: (1) crimes interfering with the core functions of the federal
government; (2) based on a federal relationship to the site of the
crime; and (3) criminalization of conduct on a Commerce Clause
basis.246
Although these guidelines are merely a faint echo of the Schwartz
proposals, they do at least provide some direction to both Congress
240 See generally id. §§ 201-12 (the purpose of the Brown Commission was to estab-
lish federal prosecutorial guidelines-part of an entire review of the federal justice
system).
241 See generally Schwartz, supra note 6, at 84-86.
242 See generally NAT'L COMMISSION, supra note 239; Schwartz, supra note 6.
243 NAT'L COMMISSION, supra note 241, § 207.
244 JAMES A. STRAZZELLA, CRIMINALJUSTICE SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE FED-
ERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW passim (1998).
245 Id. at 3, 43-56.
246 Id. at 45-46.
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and federal prosecutors. Unfortunately, like the Brown Commission's
report, they have largely gone unheeded. The temptation to provide a
federal solution to crime problems-even those which are inherently
local in nature-may just prove too great. If Congress chose to imple-
ment such standards, however, it could have a welcome effect upon
the exercise of federal prosecutorial power. Similarly, if the Justice
Department articulated standards such as those identified by the origi-
nal Schwartz article, it could force the attention of prosecutors to con-
centrate on perhaps more weighty matters where clear federal
interests exist.
2. Uniform Prosecutorial Rules
Much has been written about the efficacy of uniform guidelines
for federal prosecutors.247 Although a thorough discussion of the
merit of rules to cabin prosecutorial discretion is somewhat beyond
the scope of this piece, some salient issues are worth mentioning.
It is generally thought that federal prosecutors, regardless of the
locale in which they operate, ought to abide by similar rules. After all,
federal law and, by implication, federal interests, remain the same re-
gardless of local concerns. Uniform rules, it may be argued, will bet-
ter enable the federal government to efficiently execute investigative
and prosecutorial resources. In this manner, the Justice Department
may be able to ensure that matters of national import are pursued
regardless of what the specific needs of any individual local commu-
nity might be. Similarly, it has long been argued that the establish-
ment of such rules will inculcate uniform values with the disparate
federal prosecutorial offices, and will serve as a guide for new AUSAs.
I do not wish to dwell upon rules that would encourage prosecution,
but instead I will focus on those rules that would guide declinations.
Uniform declination rules, however, present a host of thorny
problems. Even if one accepts the utility of written guidelines aimed
at cabining discretion, political realities make uniform declination
rules throughout the nation difficult to implement. A basic political
reality is that, because of the nature of representative democracy (i.e.
every State has two Senators and at least one Representative), it may
247 See e.g., Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Pro-
duce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69 (1995); Michael A. Simons,
Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecutorial Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federaliza-
tion, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 893 (2000); Jeffrey Standen, An Economic Perspective on Federal
Criminal Law Reform, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 249 (1998); Robert Heller, Comment, Selec-
tive Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial
Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1309 (1997).
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be difficult to allocate federal resources to those jurisdictions that may
have the greatest need for federal action.248 More significantly, it may
be more difficult to shift resources away from jurisdictions in which
few crimes of national import occur.
Although there may be little federal crime in Iowa, for example,
and a great deal of crime in Manhattan, it is politically unfeasible (and
likely unwise) to scale back the Iowa U.S. Attorney's office and shift
those resources to the Southern District of New York. Local concerns
thus may dictate the way in which even federal resources are allocated.
A community that may have little "classic" federal criminal activity may
instead use the U.S. Attorney's office to supplement local efforts-
even if such matters are not national priorities and would be best han-
dled by state or other local authorities. 249 Indeed, the Reno and
Thornburgh Justice Departments were characterized by federal efforts
to assist in combating violent crime-traditionally something within
the province of local authorities. 250 U.S. Attorneys, of course, are also
generally drawn from the local bar, and thus will be steeped in local
mores and traditions. As such, even while wielding the power of the
federal government, local concerns may still take precedence. Conse-
quently, because ten grams of cocaine powder might mean one thing
to an Iowa prosecutor, and quite another to her Manhattan counter-
part, those cases are likely to be handled differently. Variations in
prosecutorial activities are thus destined to abound.
Nevertheless, uniform national guidelines do exist and have had
a degree of success. In fact, the Justice Department's Petite Policy,
which circumscribes discretion to pursue a federal prosecution follow-
ing state prosecution of crimes arising from the same conduct, acts as
a uniform national rule.25 1 Instead of leaving the decision to proceed
with a prosecution in the hands of the local U.S. Attorney, the policy
articulates the narrow circumstances in which federal interests are so
implicated that a successive prosecution is warranted. 252 Similarly, al-
though no guidelines exist per se, the Justice Department directs that
"[w] henever a case is closed without prosecution, the U.S. Attorneys'
248 Cf Heller, supra note 247, at 1310 ("Policy concerns also detailed local control
of the criminal justice system, as state governments were viewed as the political bodies
best suited for protecting citizens from the primarily local problem of crime.").
249 Cf id. at 1310-14 (explaining "the widespread presence of the federal govern-
ment in the area of criminal law").
250 Philip Oliss, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the
Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REx,. 1851, 1873-75 (1995).
251 Scott, supra note 233, at 753.
252 U.S. ATToRNEYs' MANuAL, supra note 20, § 9-2.142.
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files should reflect the action taken and the reason for it. ' '253 To this
end, basic information about declinations is recorded.
National uniform guidelines may thus be established as aspira-
tional guidelines, even if honored in the breach. Even if guidelines
are not mandatory, they could serve to set the tone for federal prose-
cutors and could serve as a model for prosecutorial conduct in gen-
eral. After all, even with differences among jurisdictions, federal
prosecution begins to look far more arbitrary when declination poli-
cies themselves vary widely among jurisdictions. Similarly, the exis-
tence of federal sentencing guidelines, which are an effort to, among
other things, reduce disparity, counsel for greater uniformity in the
sorts of cases prosecutors choose to bring.
3. Mandatory Record Keeping
That we are able to evaluate trends at all is a result of individual
prosecutors maintaining records of declined matters. To understand
prosecutorial decisionmaking, it is vital to have an accurate record of
why certain cases were not prosecuted.2 54 Presently, prosecutors are
required to keep track of cases for which they expend at least one
hour of attorney time. Statistical information reflecting patterns of
prosecution provides some insight as to why certain matters are pur-




Whenever the attorney for the government declines to commence or recom-
mend Federal prosecution, he/she should ensure that his/her decision and
the reasons therefore are communicated to the investigating agency in-
volved and to any other interested agency, and are reflected in the office
files.... When prosecution is declined in serious cases on the understanding
that action will be taken by other authorities, appropriate steps should be
taken to ensure that the matter receives their attention and to ensure coordi-
nation or follow-up.
Id.
255 See generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U. S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, COMPENDIUM
OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1998, 2000 NCJ 180258, available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs98.pdf (providing statistics encompassing all as-
pects of processing in the federal justice system, including the number of persons
prosecuted in federal criminal cases and post-conviction rates); BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES,
1996, 1999 NCJ 176981, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
fdluc96.pdf (tracking sample of felony cases from the nation's seventy-five largest
counties from arrest through sentencing, including data concerning defendant's age,
sex, and race); BuREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JAIL AND JAIL
INMATES, 1993-1994, 1995 NCJ 151651, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/jaji93.pdf (presenting inmate population statistics for all states and the Dis-
2003]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
In order to better understand declination decisions, however, the
government ought to maintain and publish additional information.
For example, information related to the types or quantities of drugs,
the amount of loss in fraud cases, or information about alternative
resolution might be a boon to deciding upon resource allocations and
expenditures in the future. Although at least some of this informa-
tion is collected, it is apparently not widely distributed to individual
U.S. Attorneys' offices, nor to law enforcement agencies. Such infor-
mation may tend to curb improper selective prosecution and may, in
turn, generate pressure for greater self-regulation within individual
U.S. Attorneys' offices. Better statistical information on declinations
and prosecutions may reveal whether troubling patterns of disparate
treatment exist and may help prosecutors understand whether articu-
lated priorities are being carried out.
Moreover, raw statistical information offers insight into the pro-
cess of selecting matters for prosecution without an intrusion into in-
dividual prosecutor's decisionmaking process. 256 By keeping close
track of declination decisions, prosecutors may be able to examine the
way certain types of cases are investigated and referred for prosecu-
tion. For example, if an office discovers that a majority of a particular
trict of Columbia); BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, STATE COURT
SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 1994, 1998 NCJ 164614, available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/scscf94.pdf (presenting survey information on drug
trafficking offenses as well as 10 other offenses including data on sex, race, and age of
convicted felons); CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 141 (describing initial prose-
cution dispositions and percentage rates for each stage of case processing in the fed-
eral criminal justice system); Bureau of Justice Statistics, BJS Clearinghouse, at http://
www.ncjrs.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2003) (distributing Bureau of Justice Statistics'
criminal justice data on computer case tapes, CD-ROMs, and diskettes); Inter-univer-
sity Consortium for Political & Social Research, Nat'l Archive of Criminal Justice Data, at
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/NACJD/index.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2003) (provid-
ing document database searches, statistical information packages, and general refer-
rals on crime and criminal justice statistics); Justice Research & Statistics Ass'n,
InfoBase of State Activities and Research, at http://www.jrsa-isar/login.asp (last visited
Nov. 21, 2003) (encompassing Justice Research and Statistics Association database,
which includes activities of state criminal justice statistical agencies and Statistical
Analysis Center); Nat'l Consortium forJustice Information and Statistics, Justice Tech-
nology Resource Center, at http://www.jtrc.search.org/Home.aspx (last visited Nov. 21,
2003) (providing data about criminal justice information systems employed by state
and local governments); Nat'l Criminal Justice Reference Serv., Drug and Crime
Clearinghouse, at http://virlib.ncjrs.org/DrugsAndCrime.asp (last visited Nov. 21,
2003) (providing data concerning illegal drugs).
256 For example, in Armstrong v. United States, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), because the
defendants asserted racial discrimination in the selection of defendants for federal
crack prosecutions, the initial question was whether such prosecution fell dispropor-
tionately on African-Americans. Id. at 456.
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federal enforcement agency's cases are routinely discarded for want of
critical evidence, training programs can be implemented to familiar-
ize officers with basic evidentiary standards.
Without accurate statistics, even prosecutors' offices may be
somewhat in the dark as to their own prosecutorial practices. Given
the relative independence of individual prosecutors, a U.S. Attorney
may not, for example, have a clear understanding of which cases his
office is focusing on, and he may not be able to justify why certain
matters are pursued, while others are declined. Accurate record keep-
ing and public reporting is vital to re-focus prosecutorial efforts as
General Ashcroft has suggested.
Statistical information provides a rough but valuable check on
the distribution of law enforcement and prosecutorial resources with-
out revealing the deliberative process that underlies the exercise of
discretion. In the interest of self-regulation, U.S. Attorneys' offices
should maintain records that profile patterns of enforcement and
non-enforcement. If the government does not maintain the pertinent
statistical data, the legislature should require the government to as-
semble the information. Congress has long mandated the gathering
of crime statistics, giving both the executive and the public a clear
sense of the rate and distribution of criminal activity, as reflected by
arrest and conviction data.257 Congress should add responsibility for
assembling records reflecting patterns in the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, including data regarding non-prosecution decisions and
the allocation of cases between federal and state courts.
Finally, if the data is published, statistical information will provide
a public window into the efforts of law enforcement. The public will
be able to understand better the fairness with which prosecutorial dis-
cretion is wielded and whether important priorities are being ad-
dressed. The public will also be better able to determine whether,
and under what circumstances, federal law is being enforced. Trans-
parency with respect to declination policies and relevant data may ulti-
mately give rise to accountability. Such accountability is a potentially
useful means of ensuring that prosecutors are appropriately and fairly
wielding governmental power in their pursuit of targets.
257 See 28 U.S.C. § 534 (2000) (mandating that the Attorney General "acquire,
collect, classify, and preserve identification, criminal identification, crime, and other
records"). The original mandate was enacted in 1930 and has since been enhanced.
For example, in 1990, Congress directed the Attorney General to gather information
relating to hate crimes. Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140
(1990).
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C. A Word on Selective Prosecution
The flip side of the decision to forgo a prosecution is obviously
the decision to proceed. Such a decision is momentous in that it
means that the awesome power of the state will be brought to bear
against an individual. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, him-
self a former prosecutor, once observed that:
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation
than any other person in America. His discretion is tremen-
dous .... If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows
that he can choose his defendants .... It is in this realm-in which
the prosecutor picks some person whom he likes or dislikes or
desires to embarrass, or selects some group of unpopular persons
and then looks for an offense, that the greatest danger of abuse in
prosecutorial power lies. It is there that law enforcement becomes
the [sic] personal. 258
What has troubled more than a few commentators is the inevita-
ble existence of selective prosecution (or non-prosecution).259 To
some extent, given resource limitations, all prosecutions are selective
in at least some sense. Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is
worth noting that the problem of selective prosecution may be itself
fueled by declination rules.
Even though the trends point to a decrease in the proportion of
matters declined, the absolute number of declined matters has risen
and still represents roughly one quarter of all referred matters. As a
consequence, prosecutorial selectivity is an inexorable artifact of re-
source scarcity. Selectivity, in and of itself, however, may not always be
a bad thing. An occasional prosecution serves to remind the public
that certain behaviors are considered wrong. The selection of certain,
notorious cases thus serves to remind the public that certain laws are
being enforced. However, selective prosecution may only be effective
if the fact of selectivity is not broadcast.260
If the public is aware of similar, unprosecuted cases, the apparent
unfairness or inconsistency of society's formal condemnation process
may undermine the deterrence value of the occasional high profile
prosecution. A haphazard system of selective enforcement thus may
undermine crime control and breed a cynical attitude among the gen-
eral public.
258 Robert H. Jackson, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y. 18, 18-19 (1940), quoted in
DAVIs, supra note 12, at 190.
259 P.S. Kane, Comment, Why Have You Singled Me Out? The Use of Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion for Selective Prosecution, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2293, 2293-95 (1992).
260 See Romero, supra note 39, at 2045-46.
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Selective enforcement, however, can take on many different
forms. For example, a policy in which only the most serious offenders
are prosecuted may not only make sense, but if prosecutors select the
most egregious cases, the public may be better able to understand the
system's rationale. Although prosecutors may treat offenders charged
with the "same crime" (loosely defined) differently, the public pre-
sumably would consider such discrimination as deserved, because the
prosecuted offender committed a more serious offense. Thus, when
Attorney General Ashcroft announces that the Justice Department will
focus on terrorism offenses, his choice is popularly digestible because
it represents a class of cases thought particularly serious. Of course,
the downside to selective prosecution of this sort is that it may send
the unintended signal that minor violators will not face prosecution.
A more problematic form of selectivity is totally unrelated to cul-
pability: certain violators are selected because they occupy positions
that make them more visible offering a stronger deterrent effect for
the same expenditure of effort and resources. The recent Enron and
WorldCom investigations serve as useful illustrations. 26 1 Even if cor-
porate misdeeds of this sort were common, the government arguably
could obtain a greater degree of deterrence if a notorious executive of
a large, multi-national corporation were brought to justice, instead of
several unknown middle managers. In this circumstance, declination
policies are likely to have little impact upon decisionmaking.
Another form of selectivity occurs when defendants are selected
at random because only a few are needed to achieve deterrent aims,
or because resources are insufficient to permit prosecution of all of-
fenders. Such "arbitrary" selection raises the potential risk that the
prosecutor will randomly select her targets. In this circumstance, dec-
lination policies may prove valuable.
Even where no alternative criminal penalties exist, the utilitarian
aims of the law may be achieved through the application of civil reme-
dies, administrative regulation, pretrial diversion programs, or restitu-
tion. Of course, the availability of an alternative to criminal
prosecution does not necessarily mean that prosecution would be in-
appropriate, but it changes the question: one should then ask whether
the added value of the criminal process or sanction is worth the added
costs of prosecution. The important point to keep in mind in decid-
ing whether to prosecute is simply that, unless one is a strict retribu-
261 Some authors have argued against unlimited prosecutorial discretion because
the decision to prosecute or decline a matter may be based on factors other than
defendant's guilt, including race and other unconstitutional considerations. See Hel-
ler, supra note 247, at 1309-10.
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tivist, any of these alternatives may be valid; the existence of a criminal
penalty does not necessarily mean that it must be invoked.
CONCLUSION
The manner in which prosecutors exercise discretion not to pro-
ceed with a matter is critical to the administration of the criminal jus-
tice system. The under-enforcement of particular offenses can have
much the same impact upon the criminal justice system that ill-consid-
ered decisions to proceed with a case do. It is extraordinarily difficult
to capture the thinking that goes into an individual prosecutor's deci-
sion not to proceed with a criminal referral. It is beyond peradven-
ture that a decision not to proceed will often be appropriate.
Determining such "appropriateness," however, is not an easy task.
This study has demonstrated recent trends in the non-prosecution of
criminal matters referred to federal prosecutors. The data has estab-
lished that increased overall prosecutorial resources have led to a de-
creased proportion in declined matters, even while more matters are
being referred for prosecution. This is of considerable interest, be-
cause this decline occurred during a time at which crime rates in the
United States dropped precipitously. In light of resource scarcity, the
study has further noted that the articulation of national priorities may
serve as a useful means of guiding prosecutorial discretion, even if not
completely controlling it. Such priorities may have practical effect
upon the day-to-day decisions prosecutors are charged with making in
the field. Attorney General Ashcroft's effort to redirect the Depart-
ment's resources to combat terrorism more effectively will only be suc-
cessful if the prosecutors in the field will respond to his leadership. In
an attempt to follow-up on the Attorney General's admonition, the
Justice Department should require substantive reporting to evaluate
whether these important priorities are being followed in the districts.
Similarly, the data show a disparity among agencies in terms of
declined matters: namely, certain federal agencies consistently seem
to have more matters declined by prosecutors. These results suggest,
at a minimum, that federal law enforcement agencies ought to receive
careful scrutiny to ensure that they are referring only the most appro-
priate cases to the U.S. Attorneys for consideration. A decision not to
prosecute is an important one, and one which has been given far too
little consideration. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks upon the
United States, the public has a right to be informed about the nation's
investigative and prosecutorial decisions-for these decisions may well
have an impact on our future security and upon the future of our
liberty interests.
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